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Abstract
This thesis considers the problem of the large amount of unwanted email that is being sent
and received, which lowers the aggregate value of email as a communication medium from
what it would otherwise be. This problem is commonly known as the "spam problem."
Solutions to the spam problem involve curbing the adverse affects of existing technology as
well as steering technology development in a socially beneficial direction. Unlike some other
technology and policy problems, the reasons for the existence of this problem are well
known and the desired effects of ideal solutions can be readily articulated. However,
attempted solutions to date have not made much progress at solving the problem. I posit
that this failure stems from the fact the spam problem is really a complex system, and that
solutions to date have not been designed to interact with this system in a useful manner.
I show that the spam problem is a complex system, and should be dealt with by developing
strategies to holistically interact with it. Such strategies must embrace both technical and
legal realities simultaneously in order to be successful. They must also avoid causing
negative side effects that negate their purpose.
First, I build a model of the system surrounding the spam problem in the form of a Causal
Loop Diagram. This diagram shows the causal interactions between the various technical,
legal, social, and economic forces that are present in the spam system. Using this diagram, I
then identify a number of places that solutions could interact with this system. These places
comprise a set of possible levers that could be pulled to alleviate the spam problem.
This set of levers is then used to make sense of the attempted and suggested solutions to
date. Various solutions are grouped by how they interact with the system. These solution
categories are then presented in detail by showing, diagrammatically, how they positively and
negatively affect the spam system through their interactions with it. In so doing, I attempt
to argue persuasively that much of the current energy expended toward the spam problem is
largely unnecessary, and in some cases, counterproductive.
I additionally argue that because of the current reality of the spam problem, i.e. particular
facts, we are already in a decent position to largely solve this problem by just redirecting
current efforts toward more appropriate activity. Such appropriate activity is suggested,
which includes steps to increase the identifiability of email in order to enable more
successful litigation. Finally, an optimistic conclusion is reached that there are no
fundamental reasons why the spam problem can not be dealt with in such a manner to
ensure the continued usefulness of email as a communication medium.
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1 Introduction
This thesis considers the problem of the large amount of unwanted email that is being sent
and received, which lowers the aggregate value of email as a communication medium from
what it would otherwise be. This problem is commonly known as the "spam problem."'
The primary argument of this thesis is that the spam problem is a complex system (termed
the Base Span System), and should be dealt with as such.
The central contribution of this thesis is a model of the Base Spam System. This model
takes a diagrammatical form that attempts to capture the various causes and effects present.
The model is structured in such a way that it can be expanded by future work as the nature
of the spam problem continues to change.
To date, attempted and proposed solution strategies to the spam problem have been less
than ideal, although numerous and varied. An argument will be presented that this failure
stems from the fact these solution strategies have not been designed to interact with the
Base Spam System in a holistic manner.
Consideration is also given to how a more holistic approach to the spam problem might be
structured. Such a holistic approach is shown to involve significant coordination between
various stakeholder groups involved in the Base Spam System. While this kind of
coordination is relatively difficult to achieve, an optimistic conclusion is reached that there is
no fundamental reasons why it is not possible.
1.1 Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided into six chapters. This first chapter proceeds by examining the
difficulties in defining spam. A definition is then chosen for the purposes of the thesis,
centering on the delineation between fraudulent and not fraudulent email sent in good faith.
The second chapter begins with a technical introduction about the process of sending email.
Then it explains how this process is exploited by spam senders. General notions on such
exploitation are explored.
The third chapter is a review of spam solution activity to date. It is not intended to be an
evaluation of solutions, but instead a compendium of the types of attempted and proposed
solutions. The third chapter explains how each type basically works so that each type can be
considered in more detail in relation to the Base Spam System in the fifth chapter.
The fourth chapter introduces the model of the Base Spam System. The model is a causal
loop diagram, which is a type of diagram used in the discipline of system dynamics. The
reasons for choosing this methodology are presented as well as an introduction to causal
loop diagrams in general. Then the Base Spam System model is built up piece by piece, with
1 SPAM® is also a registered trademark of Hormel Foods, associated with its meat product. In this paper, the
word "spam" in all of its capitalizations is used exclusively to refer to Internet spam and not to the meat
product.
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consideration given to each piece individually. The end of the fourth chapter presents the
model in its entirety, and also highlights the levers that can be pulled by solutions in attempt
to alleviate the spam problem.
The fifth chapter revisits the spam solution activity from the third chapter, but this time with
respect to the model presented in the fourth chapter. Solutions are grouped into categories
based on how they interact with the Base Spam System. Then each category is examined in
particular by placing it into the model, after which the effects of each placement are
enumerated. In so doing, this fifth chapter evaluates spam solution types to date.
The final and sixth chapter continues to build on the previous chapters and considers how a
more effective spam solution strategy might be structured. General points derived from
earlier discussion are offered, along with an example strategy. The example strategy is not
perfect nor is the only solution strategy, but simply an illustration of concepts presented.
Again, the intended central contribution of this thesis is the model of the Base Spam System.
1.2 Reading this Thesis
This thesis is intended to be read in a linear fashion. However, depending on one's
knowledge of the spam problem, some sections could be skipped without significant loss of
continuity. In particular, if one is familiar with the SMTP protocol and spam sending
techniques, one could skip chapter two in its entirety. Similarly, if one is familiar with spam
solution activity to date, one could skip chapter three in its entirety. However, even if one is
familiar with the spam problem, it is nevertheless suggested that one read the rest of this
chapter, as it introduces terms and concepts that are implicitly used in the model of the Base
Spam System.
1.3 Why the Definition of Spam is Important
Most of the rest of this chapter is spent exploring possible definitions of spam and then
settling on a useful definition for the purposes of this thesis and in general. This discussion
may seem belabored, but is nevertheless important because:
1. There are many varying and conflicting definitions of spam currently in use. Making
sense of this reality can illuminate important aspects of spam.
2. This thesis builds a model around spam, and thus this central term needs to be
clearly defined for this model to be practically useful.
3. If one dominant definition of spam could emerge, activity currently spent arguing
about what is spam and what is not spam could be refocused on more proactively
solving the spam problem.
4. The choice of the definition of spam can shape the efficacy of spam solution activity,
and thus have a pronounced impact on the timeliness of solving the spam problem.
These points will be brought out in the following sections. First, an ideal definition of spam
is considered and discarded.
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1.4 Difficulies Creating an Ideal Definition of Spam
An ideal definition of spam would have the following two properties:
1. Preciseness. The ideal definition would be precise enough such that the definition
would declare sharp rules that could be used on any email message to tell if it were
spam or not. That is, ex ante application of the definition would not result in a
category of messages that require further investigation.
2. Accuray. The ideal definition would be accurate such that if it declared a message as
spam, it would indeed be spam.
This section highlights two difficulties in creating an ideal definition. To illustrate these
difficulties, consider some of the arenas where spam is currently defined:
A. Spam as defined by individuals when dealing with the spam problem on a daily basis.
Such definitions are personal and may turn on what email individuals consider
unwanted and unsolicited. What is defined as spam for a particular individual
depends on that individual's preferences, and is codified into his or her mental
processes.
B. Spam as defined by spam content filters.2 Such definitions are used primarily by
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Email Service Providers (ESPs) to filter spam
messages for their customers. The definition in a particular instance is the algorithm
used by a given spam content filter.
C. Spam as defined by email sent that was illegal to send as determined by existing laws
within the jurisdictions from where and to which it was sent. Such definitions are
used by governments, ISPs and ESPs to prosecute spam senders. A definition in this
context would be the language of laws currently on the books in particular
jurisdictions.
D. Spam as defined by email that is prohibited by private contract between email
senders and their ISPs or ESPs. Such definitions are used by ISPs and ESPs to
prohibit spam senders from using their resources to send spam. Definitions in this
context would be the language of particular Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) that
were agreed to by particular users of ISP and ESP systems.
Definitions that arise from these arenas can easily conflict as to whether a particular message
is spam or not. For example, a spam content filter (B) may declare a message as spam even
though an individual (A) would not. Content filtering rules are based upon probabilistic
models of individual preferences. But since these preferences vary by individual, particular
declarations of spam can conflict with a particular individual's determination. In other
words, the difficulty is what is spam to someone is not necessarily spam to someone else.
To achieve ideal accuracy, preciseness must be subjugated. That is, achieving ideal accuracy
would have to involve individual decisions about what is spam in order to capture
differences in individual preferences. In so doing, messages would have to be taken on a
case by case basis, i.e. ex post application. Therefore, any definition achieving ideal accuracy
2 A spam content filter looks at the content of email messages, and declares messages as spam based upon that
content.
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would not be precise enough to draw bright lines around spam up front.3 In other words,
the tradeoff between preciseness and accuracy isfundamental to a realistic definition of spam.
The second general difficulty on creating both a precise and accurate definition of spam is
the ever-changing nature of what is general y considered spam. As more people have begun to use
email, the market for spam has grown. In turn, email users have expressed strong
preferences against spam, and as a result, prohibitions of spam sending in law (C) and
private contract (D) have grown as well. As spam senders react to these somewhat precise
definitions, they change tactics to evade them, and they no longer maintain accuracy.
In other words, what is generally considered as spam changes over time, and definitions
need to change as well if they are to maintain the same levels of accuracy. The ideal
definition is thus a perpetually moving target. To achieve both preciseness and accuracy, the
rules that make the definition precise need to be constantly updated to reflect new spam
tactics and constantly validated to achieve accuracy.
However, just because an ideal definition cannot be constructed does not mean that a
slightly less than ideal definition cannot as well. Some accuracy or some preciseness or some
of both will need to be sacrificed, but a definition of spam can still be useful. After all, even
though what is generally considered spam is ever-changing and what people consider spam
varies by individual, there exists a large subsets of messages that people generally agree are
spam and not spam. The next few sections will explore properties of realistic definitions.
1.5 Errors Made When Applying Realistic Definitions of Spam
The previous section highlighted general difficulties in pinning down a both precise and
accurate definition of spam. In reality, a given definition will be less precise or less accurate
than ideal, or both. When such a definition is applied to declare a particular message as
spam or not, two errors can be made with regards to accuracy:
(1) A message can be declared spam when it is actually not spam, i.e. afalse positive.
(2) A message can be declared as not spam when it is actually spam, i.e. afalse
negative.
First, note that the determination of whether one of these errors exists in a particular
instance assumes that a given email can absolutely be declared spam or not. This
assumption is by no means obviously valid given that this declaration is based on individual
preferences and individuals have been known to be initially wrong when making such
determinations, e.g. with email scams. However, one can suppose that an individual can
ultimatey tell whether a given message is spam or not according to their individual
preferences.4
3 Such an ideally accurate definition could be: whatever an individual ultimately considers spam, is spam, for
that individual only. See the next footnote for a discussion of the word ultimatey in this context.
4 To see this point, consider a particular individual's definition of what is spam is that which is unwanted and
unsolicited. If the user initially declares a message is wanted but it later turns out to be unwanted, that would
be a false negative. Yet to make the determination that the error occurred, i.e. that the email was really
unwanted, the individual must have subsequently decided that the message was unwanted. Thus, even though
their initial personal definition created a false negative, they were able to eventually absolutely declare the
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Second, note that these errors are intrinsic to all definitions of spam applied in an ex ante
fashion, excepting the ideal (unobtainable) definition. Therefore, any moderately precise
definition of spam must wrestle with trading-off false positives with false negatives. Both
have opportunity costs. False positives can result in missed actions that could have
otherwise been taken and derived benefit to senders and recipients, and false negatives result
in the familiar costs of sorting through spam messages for non-spam messages.
In the aggregate, both false positives and false negative also have macro effects on the email
communication medium as a whole. These effects include the reliability, trustworthiness,
and usability of email in general, and will be explored in later chapters. The tradeoff
between false positives and false negatives is distinct from that between preciseness and
accuracy. This distinction is explored in the next section.
1.6 Trading PrecisenessforAccurafy When Creating Realistic Definitions of Spam
The tradeoff between preciseness and accuracy when creating realistic definitions of spam
has been noted. Yet this tradeoff does not occur in a linear or otherwise predictable fashion.
Differing definitions can vary wildly in their accuracy, but be similarly precise, and vice-
versa.
Ideally, one would like to have a definition that is as precise and as accurate as possible. To
see how the tradeoff is involved in practice, consider the precision side of a definition by
itself. How precise a definition is involves how many messages one can say are spam or not
in an ex ante process. This involves setting up rules to say whether a particular message is
spam or not.
There are many messages for which precise rules can be made without diminishing accuracy,
e.g. messages about sums of money from deceased Nigerian kings. Yet there are also many
messages for which rules cannot be made. Here the choice is to be precise and mark them as
spam (or not) even though the choice is not clear, or be accurate and deal with these messages
on a case by case basis through individual investigation.
This tradeoff is thus distinct but related to the tradeoff between false positives and false
negatives. Being precise with messages that are not clearly spam creates false positives and
false negatives. Whether those messages are more wrongly declared spam or not spam is the
tradeoff between false positives and false negatives. The ability to better distinguish spam
from not spam thus allows you to be more precise without sacrificing accuracy.
1.7 Using Fraudulent Aspects of Messages When Creating Precise Rules
In the previous section, the tradeoff between preciseness and accuracy was explored. When
constructing a definition of spam, there is also the question of how to be precise, i.e. what
message as spam or not, just after significant deliberation, e.g. after acting on the message and receiving the
results from their actions.
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aspects of messages the precise rules will consider when declaring messages spam or not
spam. The aspects chosen are a primary distinguishing factor between spam definitions.
One aspect that seems particularly useful is whether messages are using fraudulent tactics or
not. Such tactics have evolved over time and continue to do so, but generally include tactics
that intend to deceive or mislead recipients. Some specific tactics of this nature are outlined
in the next chapter. Now consider the use of these tactics as a means to precisely declare
messages as spam or not. To do so, let us briefly back up and consider why fraudulent
tactics exist at all.
The spam problem arose and continues to exist because there are underlying economic
market incentives that drive it. Spam reaches literally hundreds of millions of potential
buyers, and some of those people do indeed respond. Additionally, the cost of reaching
those people via spam is (currently) significantly less than the revenues generated.
It is a problem because while some people do indeed respond and thus in some sense want
spam messages, the vast majority of people do not want the messages but nevertheless must
deal with them.5 As mentioned, dealing with them takes time, and this time has opportunity
cost. As a result, most people have become understandably concerned because they are
bearing costs they do not want to bear.
The codification of anti-spam rules into laws and AUPs has grown in reaction to this
concern. Just as there is a private economic interest in sending spam, there is also a private
economic interest in alleviating concern to retain and capture customers. In addition, there
is a public economic interest in getting back the aggregate opportunity costs lost when
people deal with spam.
Definitions of spam within laws and AUPs are used to not only mark messages as spam, but
also to identify spam senders in order to deny them access to spam sending resources. This
latter use is driven by the attempt to stop the spam problem at its source, i.e. stop spam
senders. In other words, if ISPs and ESPs could precisely and accurately identify spam
senders on their networks, they could similarly precisely and accurately identify spam. The
problem of identifying spam is thus reduced to the problem of identifying spam senders.
The basic way to identify spam senders is to trace spam sent to particular network users. As
we will see in the next chapter, this is no easy task given the technical reality of email
sending. Nevertheless, for spam senders to continue doing what is prohibited by laws and
AUPs, they have had to engage in more and more fraudulent tactics to mislead and deceive
recipients, ISPs, ESPs, and governments about their identities and intentions. Otherwise,
they would be easily identified and quickly kicked off the network, and, perhaps also
prosecuted.
Spam senders thus have significant incentives to engage in fraudulent behavior in order to
avoid getting caught and to continue to make money from spam sending. On the other
hand, non-sparm senders, for the most part, have no reason to engage in fraudulent tactics
5 ISPs and ESPs must also bear the cost of transferring these messages, and in some cases, dealing with them
on behalf of their customers.
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when sending email.6 Therefore, if spam is at least partially defined with regards to the use
of fraudulent tactics, such a definition may usefully isolate spam senders in such a way that
they can be more easily prosecuted by governments and shut off by ISPs and ESPs. We
now consider this point in an attempt to construct a useful definition of spam for the
purposes of the rest of this thesis.
1.8 Constructing a Useful Definition of Spam
To summarize the previous sections, when constructing a useful definition of spam, the
following things should be considered:
1. The tradeoff between preciseness and accuracy.
2. The tradeoff between false positives and false negatives.
3. The stratification of spam senders and non-spam senders through highlighting the
use of fraudulent tactics.
Now, a top-down approach is taken to arrive at a particular definition for use throughout the
rest of this thesis.
Consider the following two properties of a given email:
1. Whether the email uses fraudulent tactics or not; and
2. Whether the email contains a valid opt-out mechanism.
The latter property refers to a process whereby the recipient of an email can contact the
sender of the email to request to receive no more emails from the sender.7 These properties
are represented in the following table (Table 1).
Table 1 Email Properties and Their Relation to Spam
Fraudulent/ Opt-Out Yes (Opt-out Does Work) No (Opt-out Does Not Work)
Yes (Fraudulent) Spam Spam
No (Not Fraudulent) Not Spam? Spam
There is general agreement that fraudulent email is spam irregardless of whether a valid opt-
out mechanism exists or not.8 Additionally, there is also general agreement that non-
fraudulent email that nevertheless does not have a valid opt-out mechanism is also spam
because the recipient cannot engage in a meaningful process to stop future messages.9
Therefore, I believe that declaring these categories as spam is not particularly controversial
and thus those declarations will be accepted as part of the definition of spam for the
purposes of the rest of this thesis.
6 An exception may be the desire for anonymous email communication. However, to the extent that this
market exists, re-mailing services could be expanded to fill this market as needed.
7 This property applies to all email, including non-commercial and personal email. In these cases, "opting-out"
would include the ability to reply and ask to be removed from further communication from that person or
organization.
8 Note that still, from previous discussion, declaring all fraudulent email as spam can lead to false positives
depending on individual preferences on what is spam or not. For instance, an anonymous email (achieved by
using fraudulent tactics) that is nevertheless wanted by a given recipient could be viewed as a false positive
under a definition that considers all fraudulent email as spam.
9 Again (see last footnote), while there is general agreement, such a precise definition can lead to false positives.
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Controversy arises in the last category, however. This category is email that does not use
fraudulent tactics and does establish a valid opt-out mechanism. As such, consider further
dividing this sub-category along the following two sub-properties:
1. Whether the email is commercial in nature.
2. Whether the email was solicited.
These sub-properties are represented in the following table (Table 2).
Table 2 Sub-categories of Email that is Not Fraudulent and has Working Opt-out
Commercial/Solicited Solicited Unsolicited
Commercial Not Spam Spam?
Non-Commercial Not Spam Not Spam?
Solicited email in the sense that the recipient knowingly took some action to receive the
email and expects it to come is generally agreed as not spam. Remember that in this table, all
of these messages contain valid opt-out mechanisms such that recipients can stop future
messages from occurring if desired.
First, note that often the difference between unsolicited and solicited is hard to prove in
practice. People commonly forget what they signed up for, and they also do not know a
priori what to expect when explicitly allow companies' "partners" to send them messages.
Nevertheless, if we assume email is truly unsolicited, both the commercial and non-
commercial sub-categories of this type of email are questionable as to whether they are
absolutely spam or not.
Non-commercial unsolicited email includes much email from friends and family, and
therefore is generally thought of as not spam. However, more borderline cases can exist
such as unsolicited email related to political or religious causes. The commercial side
contains email that is often considered spam by individuals. However, it can also include
things like someone asking you personally for a job.
Given that there are clearly both spam and not spam in these sub-categories, there might be
a tendency to further subdivide them using more properties, such as whether email was sent
in bulk. And that is certainly what some definitions of spam do. However, each property
added means a potential fight over whether that property truly applies or not to a given
message.
A simpler approach would be to back up and declare the entire second table as not spam,
and stick to a definition as outlined in the first table (Table 1). The United States
government has essentially taken this approach. °1 Email that does not use fraudulent tactics
and includes a valid opt-out mechanism is considered not spam. This thesis also adopts this
approach, i.e. only the three boxes labeled 'Spam' in Table 1 are indeed spam. The next
section explores specific reasons for this adoption.
10 The only significant difference is that they only consider commercial email, as defined by statute (CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003, Sec. 3 (2)), to have the possibility of being spam. In other words, non-commercial email is
categorically not spam even if it does not have a valid opt-out mechanism.
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1.9 What is Spam?
Spam, for the purposes of this thesis, is email that usesffraudulent tactics or does not contain a valid
opt-out mechanism. There are several arguments for why this is a useful definition to adopt.
First, this definition is simple. A set of fraudulent tactics can be enumerated into an
extended definition, and as new fraudulent tactics evolve over time, they can be included as
well. The details of a valid opt-out mechanism can similarly be enumerated into an extended
definition.
Second, agreement on this definition can focus spam solution activity. In particular,
solutions can then focus on creating algorithms to detect fraudulent tactics and valid opt-out
mechanisms ex ante. To the extent that this is not possible given the technical realities of
email protocols, those protocols can be augmented to allow for ex ante application.
Third, agreement on the definition and refocusing of spam solution activity would further
stratify spam senders from non-spam senders. That is, non-spam senders would have more
incentives to not use fraudulent tactics and to have valid opt-out mechanisms. Spam senders
would similarly be forced to reveal their identities and deal with customer complaints or risk
being shut off by ISPs and ESPs and prosecution.
Fourth, this definition largely captures spam today. A Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
study in 2003 found that about two thirds of spam messages contained fraudulent content of
one form or another (Federal Trade Commission, 2003). If the definition was agreed to in
some critical fashion, this percentage would be expected to rise as the stratification of non-
spam senders from spam senders continued. In other words, the act of accepting this
definition would in and of itself tend to capture more of spam in the future.
There are drawbacks, however. First, this definition is not as precise as other definitions.
That is, applying it today to a large subset of messages would require some case by case
investigation, or a lot of false positives or negatives. However, this drawback can largely be
mitigated by refocusing spam solution activity to create the technical means for ex ante
application of the definition. More on this will be explored in subsequent chapters.
Second, this definition allows unsolicited email from a given legal entity, once. This first email
may currently be considered spam by many recipients, and thus may result in many false
negatives. However, individual preferences could change over time given agreement on this
definition. That is, if email recipients understood that this first email was allowed and
believed that opt-out mechanisms worked, many of these false negatives would disappear as
individual ideas about spam changed.
Furthermore, if too many false negatives were occurring, the definition could easily be
expanded to include more sub-categories, like was started to do in the previous section.
However, it is not at all obvious that such further distinctions are needed, so until that is
proven, the simpler definition seems the better choice.
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1.10 The Span Ratio
Now that a definition of spam has been adopted, the general nature of the spam problem
that will be analyzed in subsequent chapters is examined. As long as the costs of sending
spam remain significantly lower than the revenues generated from responses, there will be a
significant market opportunity to send spam because of the profit opportunity. Yet despite
this large opportunity, only a handful of people send significant amounts of spam-fewer
than 200 spam operations send about 9 0% of the spam.
This striking proposition is made by Spamhaus, a vigilante group that tracks spam operations
(Spamhaus, 2004). Note that this does not mean that only two hundred products or services
are sold via spam. Some of these operations contract out their services to other businesses;
in other words, they have specialized in sending spam in the global marketplace.
In the aggregate, these operations are sending a lot of spam. Spam estimators claim that
over 12 billion spam messages are sent each day, and now account for over 60% of all
messages." Note that the ratio of spam to non-spam for actual recipients is not necessarily
the same percentage, because many of the spam messages are filtered out in one way or
another before they reach inboxes.
For recipients, this latter metric, i.e. the ratio ofspam to total email received, is the real barometer
of the spam problem. For the purposes of the rest of this thesis, this metric is termed the
spam ratio. If the spam ratio is small, e.g. 0.05 (5%), then spam is empirically trivial to deal
with because only 1 in 20 messages is spam. The spam problem has arisen as the spam ratio
has increased, which it has significantly in recent years.'2
As this has happened, the problem has become manifest through the visible costs of dealing
with false positives and false negatives. As mentioned earlier, in the aggregate, these costs
can lead to loss in reliability, trustworthiness, and usability of email as a communications
medium in general. These effects are examined in detail in subsequent chapters through the
model of the Base Spam System.
In this chapter, spam and the spam problem have been defined. In so doing, various aspects
of the spam problem were mentioned, including the use of fraudulent tactics by spam
senders and the costs of false positives and false negatives. In the next chapter, the technical
process of sending email is enumerated, and the exploitation of this process is explored.
" Brightmail, self-pronounced "Anti-Spam" leader maintains spam statistics page at and currently claims (as of
April 2004), that 64% of all email transmitted is spam (Brightmail, 2004). Spam Filter Review, a Web site that
reviews spam filter software, maintains broader, but slightly older statistics and report that in for 2003, on
average, 31 billion emails are sent every day, 12.4 billion of which are spam, or approximately 40% (Spam Filter
Review, 2004). Also see SpamCon Foundation, 2004.
12 This ratio is harder to monitor because of the filtering problem mentioned. If assumed roughly tied to the
ratio of wanted email to all email that is sent, Brightmail reports this ratio has risen from 48% to 64% since
May 2003 (Brightmail, 2004). Some isolated examples of actual spam ratios do exist though; these include an
AOL account (TESP.com, 2004) and a user in the Netherlands (Wouters, 2004).
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2 Sending Email
In the first chapter, spam and the spam problem were defined. In this chapter, the technical
process of sending email is enumerated, and the general exploitation of this process is
explored. Today, almost all Internet users have one or more email accounts that they use to
regularly communicate both personally and commercially (Pew Internet & American Life
Project, 2004). This huge email user base is the underlying driver of spam -the same
underlying driver that drives junk mail and junk faxes-an opportunity to reach people. For
email, this opportunity is especially significant because the cost of sending email is extremely
low to the sender.
Moreover, email has been increasingly used for commercial use, but the basic email
protocols were not designed with commercial use in mind. Over the years, end-user email
applications have adapted to enable more effective commercial use, e.g. by displaying in-line
product graphics and order forms. Yet even as this expansion has taken place, the basic
email protocols have not changed significantly. I will now introduce these protocols, and
explain why the email system they comprise has enabled the spam problem to take its
current form.
2. 1 Basic Email Protocols
The fundamentals of the email technology that we use today were developed before the
spam problem was a problem, and even before the widespread use of the Internet.1 3 There
are three main protocols in use to send and receive basic email. The standard way to send
email is to use the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), which was officially proposed in
1982 (Postel, 1982). To receive email, users commonly use either the Post Office Protocol
(POP), which was officially proposed in 1984 (Reynolds, 1984), or the Internet Message
Access Protocol, which was officially proposed in 1996 (Crispin, 1996). These protocols
have been updated, but in so doing, they were not significantly modified with respect to the
spam problem.14
Consider the sending of an email from a sender to a recipient (see Figure 1). The sender
commonly composes the email in an email "client" (end-user application). Email clients are
the pieces of software that email users commonly associate with email, and include such
popular desktop applications as Microsoft Outlook and Eudora. These clients typically have
the ability to use all three main protocols. When sending an email, the client transmits the
email message to the Sender's Email Server via SMTP. (An email server generally is a
computer that transmits email messages through the Internet to other email servers, and can
make particular email messages available to users for download as appropriate.) This email
13 Some say the first email considered spam by some people was sent in 1978 (Templeton, 2004), while others
point to a message in 1994 (Everett-Church, 1999). As such, when exactly the "spam problem" become a real
problem is certainly debatable, but was definitely by 1996 (Windigo, 1996). When "the widespread use of the
Internet" occurred is also debatable, but again, 1996 is a decent first-order estimate (Ratnatunga, 2004).
14 The latest major revision of SMTP was in 2001 (Klensin, 2001); the latest major revision of POP was in 1996
(Myers et al., 1996); and the latest major revision of IMAP was in 2003 (Crispin, 2003)
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server is usually associated with and maintained by the sender's Internet Service Provider
(ISP) or organization.
Figure 1 Email Protocols in Use
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Once the message is on the Sender's Email Server, that server transmits the message to what
it believes to be the Recipient's Email Server via SMTP in the same fashion the sender's
email client transmitted the message to it. The email server that the Sender's Email Server
transmits the message to, however, may in fact not be the Recipient's Email Server if the
recipient or his/her ISP or organization has set up some sort of email forwarding system.
For example, many people maintain vanity email addresses, which forward to other email
accounts. If there are Intermediate Email Servers, the message gets transmitted in the same
fashion via SMTP until it reaches the final Recipient's Email Server.
Once the Recipient's Email Server has the message, it deposits the message in a place
designated for the recipient. The recipient can then pick up the message when desired, using
either the POP or IMAP protocols. The primary difference between these two receiving
protocols is that with IMAP, the message remains on the server, whereas with POP, the
message is removed from the server. Users that use Webmail clients, e.g. Hotmail, would
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not necessarily use either POP or IMAP, but would connect directly with the last server via a
Web application.
Amazingly, these protocols have continued to perform effectively as described while email
traffic has increased by many orders of magnitude. Nevertheless, the Internet is a very
different place now (in both size and nature) from the early 1980s, and if the protocol
designers could have seen this future, they might have designed the protocols differently.
With regards to the spam problem in particular, the significant architectural issues lie within
SMTP. POP and IMAP are just used for receiving email that already exists, and therefore,
are not particularly relevant to the spam problem. To understand technically how spam and
spam solutions work, it is necessary to understand how basic SMTP works. As such, I will
now explain SMTP in more detail.
2.2 SMTP Basics
Consider the first step in the above discussion and picture, namely the transmission of an
email message from the Sender's Email Client to the Sender's Email Server via SMTP. As
noted, the other SMTP transmissions between the email servers occur in the same fashion as
this first step, and thus we can concentrate on only this first step (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 SMTP In Use
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Sending a standard email via SMTP is a six step process, including connecting and
disconnecting from the email server. I will outline the steps, and then present a detailed
example. First, a connection is made to the server, which can be done through a variety of
means (connect), and the server sends back an acknowledgement (ACK). Second, the
HELO command is sent identifying the sender's computer, followed by an
acknowledgement from the server. Third, the MAIL FROM command is sent identifying
the sender, followed by an acknowledgment from the server. Fourth, the RCPT TO
command is sent identifying the receiver, followed by an acknowledgement from the server.
Fifth, the DATA command is sent including the message itself, followed by a final
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acknowledgement from the server. Finally, the QUIT command is sent, followed by the
server closing the connection (close).
To make this process more clear, I will now enumerate a real life example. Consider the act
of sending an email manually using the basic SMTP process from the figure. Not many
people actually send email this way. However, this is the same process most email clients go
through automatically when people hit the send buttons in their email clients, and it is
instructive to illustrating major spam techniques. What I sent to the email server appears in
bold, and what the server sent back to me is in italics.
1. First, I connected to the email server via telnet (connect), which immediately
acknowledged my connection (ACK) by identifying itself.
220 MIT.EDU ESMTP Sendmail (no collect or thirdparty calls) at Fri, 2 Ju12004 16:56:19 -0400 (EDT)
2. Next, I began the standard SMTP exchange (Yahoo, 2004). First, I identified myself
with the HELO command followed by my domain name. The server responded
affirmatively (ACK), which you can tell by the leading '250' response.
HELO MUCKLEY-THREE-NINETY-FOUR.MIT.EDU
250 fort-point-station.mit.edu Hello MUCKLEY-THREE-NINETY-FOURMIT.EDU [18.172.6.138], pleased
to meetyou
3. Then I told the server where this message came from using the MAIL FROM
command. The server acknowledges affirmatively (ACK) via the '250' response.
MAIL FROM: <YEGG@ALUM.MIT.EDU>
250 2.1.0 <YEGG@ALUM.MIT.EDU>... Sender ok
4. Then I told the server where this message is going using the RCPT TO command.
The server acknowledges affirmatively (ACK) via the '250' response.
RCPT TO: <YEGG@MIT.EDU>
250 2.1.5 <YEGG@MIT.EDU>... Recipient ok
5. Next, I actually specified the email to be sent using the DATA command. The
email is broken into two sections, the header and the body. The header contains
meta-information about the email, such as the subject. Each header field has a
name, e.g. 'Subject', and then an associated value, e.g. 'TEST SUBJECT', separated
by a colon and a space. Then one blank line separates the header from the body.
Finally, a single dot on a line by itself signifies the end of the message. The server
then acknowledges affirmatively (ACK), again via the '250' response.
DATA
354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
FROM: YEGG@ALUM.MIT.EDU
TO: YEGG@MIT.EDU
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SUBJECT: TEST SUBJECT
TEST BODY
250 2.0.0 i62K1 VRg018045 Message acceptedfor delivery
6. Finally, I said goodbye using the QUIT command, and I assumed the mail will be
delivered successfully, given all the affirmative responses. The server closes the
connection (close).
QUIT
221 2.0.0fort-point-station.mit.edu closing connection
2.3 Email Format
After sending the email above, I had my email client, Microsoft Office Outlook 2003,
receive the mail using the Post Office Protocol (POP) (Yahoo, 2004). After receiving the
email, I went to View-Options, and copied the full headers of the email received, and
pasted them below.
Status: U
Return-Path: <YEGG@ALUM.MIT.EDU>
Received: from alum-2.mit.edu ([18.7.21.145])
by james.mail.atl.earthlink.net (EarthLink SMTP Server) with ESMTP id lbGwdk7e83Nl3r10O
for <yegg@mindspring.com>; Fri, 2 Jul 2004 18:08:58 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from fort-point-station.mit.edu (FORT-POINT-STATION.MIT.EDU [18.7.7.76])
by alum-2.mit.edu (8 .1 2.8p2 /8.12 .8 ) with ESMTP id i62M8w24025072
for <yegg@ALUM.MIT.EDU>; Fri, 2 Jul 2004 18:08:58 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from MUCKLEY-THREE-NINETY-FOUR.MIT.EDU (MUCKLEY-THREE-NINETY-
FOUR.MIT.EDU [18.172.6.138])
by fort-point-station.mit.edu (8.12.4/8.9.2) with SMTP id i62M7POW023041
for <YEGG@MIT.EDU>; Fri, 2 Jul 2004 18:08:35 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 2004 18:07:25 -0400 (EDT)
Message-Id: <200407022208.i62M7POW023041 @fort-point-station.mit.edu>
FROM: YEGG@ALUM.MIT.EDU
TO: YEGG@MIT.EDU
SUBJECT: TEST SUBJECT
X-EFL-Spamscore: 59%
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-ELNK-AV: 0
The message format in general is governed by a proposal related to SMTP (Resnick, 2001).
The first thing to note from this example is that this header is much larger than the header
that I sent. Recall that I only sent 'From', 'To', and 'Subject' header lines, but yet there are
many other headers lines here, including several 'Received' lines, an 'X-Spam-Flag' line, etc.
Additionally, hardly any of these extra header lines are displayed in my inbox view. In fact,
all I see from the headers above in my inbox view is the following.
From: YEGG@ALUM.MIT.EDU
To: YEGG@MIT.EDU
Subject: TEST SUBJECT
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Sent: Fri 7/2/2004 4:02PM
The extra headers were added in the process of sending the email, and are used by email
clients and servers for various purposes. Certain headers have particular universal meanings.
For instance, each email server that handles the message is supposed to add a 'Received'
header line that specifies who that server received the message from and at what time. You
can see that my message to YEGG@MIT.EDU was actually forwarded to
YEGG@ALUM.MIT.EDU, and then forwarded to YEGG@MINDSPRING.COM. Thus
after I transmitted the message to the MIT SMTP server, it transmitted the message to the
MIT Alum SMTP server, which then transmitted the message to the Earthlink SMTP server,
and each server added a 'Received' header line in the process. 5
Other non-standard fields can be added as needed, and are usually preceded by 'X-'. Email
servers are supposed to simply pass these header lines through. In the email that I received,
you can see that three such lines were added (X-EFL-Spamscore, X-Spam-Flag, X-ELNK-
AV), which have to do with spam and anti-virus programs.
2.4 SMTP Exploitation
The SMTP exchange described in the previous sections is often exploited by spam senders.
This section describes a primary way in which such exploitation is done. Consider the
following example exchange conducted by me with the MIT SMTP server. Again, the bold
signifies what I sent to the email server, and the italics signify what the server sent back to
me.
220 MIT.EDU ESMTP Sendmail (no collect or thirdparty calls) at Fri, 2Ju 2Ju12004 16:56:19 -0400 (EDT)
HELO WHITEHOUSE.GOV
250fort-point-station.mit.edu Hello MUCKLEY-THREE-NINETY-FOURMIT.EDU [18.172.6.138], pleased to meet
you
MAIL FROM: <GWBUSH®WHITEHOUSE.GOV>
250 2.1.0 <GWBUSH@ WHITEHOUSE.GOV>... Sender ok
RCPT TO: <YEGG@MIT.EDU>
250 2.1.5 <YEGG@MIT.EDU>... Recipient ok
DATA
354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
TO: YEGG®MIT.EDU
X-WHATEVER: WHATEVER
250 2.0.0 i62KuJO W02981 1 Message acceptedfor delivery
QUIT
221 2.0.0fort-point-station.mit.edu closing connection
I have apparently sent a message purportedly from the White House, and specifically from
an email address that might be associated with the US President. This does not have to be
done manually, and can actually be done easily in most email clients.' 6 Again, the following
is what I see as the headers upon receipt.
15 Earthlink, Inc. bought MindSpring Enterprises in 1999.
16 In Microsoft Outlook, for example, when one composes a message, one can go to ViewFrom Field, and
then type any address next to the From box.
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Status: U
Return-Path: <GWBUSH@WHITEHOUSE.GOV>
Received: from alum-2.mit.edu ([18.7.21.145])
by aaron.mail.atl.earthlink.net (EarthLink SMTP Server) with ESMTP id lbGwfi4T3Nl3qa2
for <yegg@mindspring.com>; Fri, 2 Jul 2004 18:11:00 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from fort-point-station.mit.edu (FORT-POINT-STATION.MIT.EDU [18.7.7.76])
by alum-2.mit.edu (8.12.8p2/8.12.8) with ESMTP id i62MAu24002192
for <yegg@alum.mit.edu>; Fri, 2 Jul 2004 18:10:56 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from WHITEHOUSE.GOV (MUCKLEY-THREE-NINETY-FOUR.MIT.EDU [18.172.6.138])
by fort-point-station.mit.edu (8.12.4/8.9.2) with SMTP id i62MABOW025522
for <YEGG@MIT.EDU>; Fri, 2 Jul 2004 18:10:42 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Fri, 2Jul 2004 18:10:11 -0400 (EDT)
From: GWBUSH@WHITEHOUSE.GOV
Message-Id: <200407022210.i62MABOW025522fort-point-station.mit.edu>
TO: YEGG@MIT.EDU
X-WHATEVER: WHATEVER
X-EFL-Spamscore: 87%
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-ELNK-AV: 0
From this example, you can see that everything sent to the email server can be easily
exploited (forged). The one notable exception is the 'To' header field, which is needed to
actually deliver the email to the intended recipient. Additionally, only the 'To' field is
essential, and in this example I only sent the 'To' field and an 'X-WHATEVER' field, which
I just made up and which was passed through intact as expected. I could similarly make up
and include other 'X-' fields to make a particular message seem like it came from certain
email clients, such as Outlook or Eudora or Hotmail. To do so, I would just add the extra
header lines that those email clients usually add, and in most cases there is really no way for
the recipient to tell the difference.
Furthermore, I could add my own 'Received' headers to pretend that the email was received
and relayed by various email servers throughout the Internet. Note, however, that the final
email server, and any email servers in-between, can always add their own additional fields to
whatever I send, including their own 'Received' header lines. In other words, I can make my
message seem like it passed through various hops or came from a particular email client, but
I can also do nothing to prevent MIT from adding its own headers. For instance, the 'X-
EFL-Spamscore' line in this example was not added be me.
Finally, note that the SMTP exploitation outlined in this section is the exploitation of the
SMTP exchange through the submission of information that is fraudulent, i.e. not
representative of the true sender. Such exploitation is distinct from the act of accessing
SMTP servers that one is not authorized to access. That is, many SMTP servers are only
open to certain computers, often those that are maintained by the same organizations that
maintain the SMTP servers. For example, an ISP might only let its customers send email
through its SMTP servers.
This process of authenticating and authorizing certain computers or users to use certain
SMTP servers is called SMTP Authentication. The point of this process is to authenticate
that that senders connecting to the email servers are who they say they are and that they are
authorized to connect (Myers, 1999). However, once authenticated and authorized, nothing
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prevents the SMTP exploitation as outlined in this section to take place. For example, MIT
uses a form of SMTP Authentication, but once I connected to the email server successfully,
I could engage in the above exploitive exchange notwithstanding.' 7
2.5 IP Address Basics
In the previous section, SMTP exploitation was explored. Given the possibility of such
exploitation, it follows that email exchanges are not particularly "trustable." In fact, the only
inherently trustable part of the exchange is that to make an exchange, the sender has to
connect to the server from somewhere. That is, by connecting to the server, the sender has
to actually send information to it through the Internet, and by so doing, expose an IP
address to it. IP addresses are numerical codes that identify devices on the Internet and are
used for the very purpose of exchanging information with other devices on the Internet
(Wikipedia, 2004).
In the example exchange in the previous section, the IP address used to connect to the
server is displayed after the HELO line. The server printed it in its response, in brackets
[18.172.6.138]. Servers do not have to display the sender IP address in brackets in this
manner, but they usually include this information in the 'Received' headers they add to
emails, and thus, by looking at the first received header in a given email (chronologically),
one can usually reliably determine the IP address from which the email originated. Even if
the server does not display the address, it is aware of the address because it needs to know it
to communicate effectively with the sender. Additionally, this information can and often is
logged in the background for future reference.
Given a reliable IP address, one can begin to reliably identify the sender. This identification
stems from the fact that one cannot simply make up an IP address and then hope to connect
to the Internet in a useful manner. On the contrary, the IP address is the essential piece of
information needed to route information, like a mailing address in the real world. Just like
the postal service issues mailing addresses, the connectors to the Internet, e.g. ISPs, issue IP
addresses.
In other words, given a working IP address, by definition, allows one to send information to
that device connected to the Internet. The route used to send that information can be
analyzed, much like tracking a regular snail mail through various postal service centers.'8 At
17 From this point, one should not conclude that SMTP Authentication is not useful, however. In the scenario
explored, MIT would have a better idea who I am from the SMTP Authentication process, and thus could
potentially more usefully act to prevent further SMTP exploitation. For example, they could prevent my future
access.
I8 For example, using the popular 'traceroute' program, I can "ask" routers that are in the route between MIT
and my home computer to list their IP addresses. The following is the output returned.
traceroute to 24.218.138.161 (24.218.138.161), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets
1 W92-RTR-1-W92SRV16.MIT.EDU (18.7.16.1) 0.652 ms 0.729 ms 0.401 ms
2 EXTERNAL-RTR-2-BACKBONE.MIT.EDU (18.168.0.27) 0.479 ms 0.467 ms 0.480 ms
3 24.218.0.193 (24.218.0.193) 0.594 ms 0.631 ms 0.590 ms
4 bar02-p4-0.ndhmhel.ma.attbb.net (24.91.0.158) 0.952 ms 0.862 ms 0.834 ms
5 65.96.1.154 (65.96.1.154) 0.946 ms 0.966 ms 0.974 ms
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some point when tracing a route to a particular IP address, a router is reached from the
issuing party of that IP address, be it an ISP, country, educational institution, etc. Then one
can go to that entity and ask it to reveal more information associated with that particular IP
address. Even if that is not possible, one can often pinpoint the IP address around a rather
tight geographical location.'9
2.6 IP Address Exploitation
From the previous sections, we conclude that the IP address is the only relatively trustable
part of the SMTP exchange.20 As such, it has been used considerably in various attempted
and proposed spam solutions to date. These solutions are outlined in the following chapter.
As noted, one way the IP address can be used is in an attempt to trace the sender. To the
extent that this is possible, the IP address is obviously useful in enforcement efforts. It is
important to note, however, that an IP address identifies just a device, and not aperson that
was actually operating the device at some time. As such, this relationship between person
and device can be exploited by using IP addresses that are not easily traceable beyond the
device to the person operating the device. Such IP Address Exploitation can be conducted
through a variety of means, some of which are briefly noted below.
Open Proxies
Open proxies are servers that enable people to connect remotely to a network, and
then communicate to the outside world as if they were actually located within the
network that they are connecting through (Wikipedia, 2004). For example, a
connection can be made from a home computer to a work proxy server by
connecting directly by dial-up modem or through the Internet via telnet or other
mechanisms. Once connected, the home computer can then access other machines
around the Internet through the proxy. The proxy acts as an intermediary, relaying
information from the remote servers to the home computer. In the process, it only
exposes its IP address to the remote servers and not the IP address of the home
computer.
6 c-24-218-191-178.ne.client2.attbi.com (24.218.191.178) 1.010 ms 1.074 ms 0.951 ms
7 ***
8 ***
9 ***
t9 Several companies specialize in mapping IP addresses to geographical locations and other information. For
example, Maxmind (MaxMind, 2004) sells several such databases, and Visualware sells a product called
VisualRoute (Visualware, 2004), which is a graphical route tracing program that maps the actual route locations
across the globe.
20 The word relatively is used because it is possible to forge or "spoof' an IP address, but doing so involves
significant guess work and is extremely difficult with newer routers that have anti-spoofing technology built in
(Tanase, 2003). As such, spoofing IP addresses when conducting an SMTP exchange is not practical because
the sender can not see the exchange, and thus is unable to see if is proceeding successfully or not. Recall that
there is not just one step in the SMTP exchange, but six, all with acknowledgements from the server. Spoofing
would thus require guessing correctly when steps have completed, and hoping that all acknowledgements are
affirmative.
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* Open Relays
Open Relays are email servers that will accept mail for any domain, and then relay
the mail not for their internal domains to the appropriate parties (Open Relay
DataBase, 2004). In and of themselves, open relays do not completely mask the
original IP address, which should be added in the 'Received' header of messages as
discussed previously. However, they make it harder to stop certain IP addresses
from sending email because those IP addresses are no longer connecting directly to
the recipients' SMTP servers. Instead, the open relay connects to those servers on
behalf of the original IP address. Thus, in order to block certain IP addresses from
originating mail to a particular server, the recipients' SMTP servers need to examine
the headers of the messages (content), which is significantly slower than just blocking
certain IP addresses from connecting. Furthermore, when open proxies are
connected to open relays, one can originate an email from the network of the open
proxy and then send email through another network's open relay, leaving no trace of
the original IP address on the email itself.
* Free Web-based EmailAccounts
When free Web-based email accounts are used to send messages, the server's IP
address connects to recipients' SMTP servers on behalf of the person connecting to
the Web server. In other words, the IP address of the user connecting to the Web-
based email account is not included in the 'Received' header, but instead the IP
address of the server is included. Some, but certainly not all free Web-based email
services, have begun to add the user's IP address to the email header via various
header fields, such as the 'X-Originating-IP' field. Again, however, this security
mechanism is undermined if the user is connecting to their Web-based email account
via an open proxy. In that case, the so-called originating IP address that is added to
the email header is not really that of the sender, but instead that of the open proxy.
Also note that non-free Web-based email accounts are also dangerous in the same
fashion, but are less dangerous because they are harder to obtain since valid payment
information must usually be exchanged before use.
* Hjacked Machines- Zombies
Another common way people use IP addresses that are not traceable to themselves is
to simply use others' machines. This can either be done physically by breaking and
entering or using a shared computer lab or through software by breaking into the
machines through the network and then operating them remotely. Recently the
latter tactic has been accomplished via viruses, not coincidentally that have been
spread via email. Note that through viruses and other available tools, breaking into
machines through the network does not require great technical expertise in all
instances. (The machines compromised by viruses that send email on behalf of
spammers are often referred to as "zombie" machines.)
There are certainly other ways to conduct IP address exploitation, and these ways may
certainly evolve further over time into still new ways. However, the general notion of
attempting to exploit the email system to hide ones identity will remain the same.
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2.7 Email Exploitation Summaried
This chapter has introduced basic email sending processes, and shown some ways in which
those processes they can be exploited. Exploitation in this context is attempts to
fraudulently identify the senders of email messages or the devices from which they
originated. Some of these exploitation techniques, those mentioned in the text, are shown in
the following table (Table 3).
Table 3 Email Exploitation Techniques
Technique Level of Difficulty to Do and Not Easily
Get Caught (1-Easy to 5-Hard)
Forge email headers 1
Manually Use Web-based Email Accounts 2
Find and use Open Proxies 3
Find and use Open Relays 3
Sign up Fraudulently with ISPs 3
Automatically Use Web-based Email Accounts 4
Use Existing Tools to Break Into Machines 4
Create New Tools to Break Into Machines 5
The second column in the table considers how difficult the techniques are to conduct
without getting caught. These levels of difficulties are of course estimates, and may vary
from one situation to the next. Additionally, they may change significantly over time. I have
included them to indicate difficulty in a relative sense across the techniques.
The next chapter reviews spam solution activity, and explains many attempted and proposed
solutions to date. Some of these solutions attempt to make the exploitation techniques
explored in this chapter harder to do without easily getting caught.
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3 Review of Spam Solution Activity
The previous two chapters have attempted to partially characterize the spam problem. This
chapter builds on that characterization by reviewing spam solution activity to date. Please
note that this chapter is not intended to be an evaluation of solutions, but instead a
compendium of the types of attempted and proposed solutions. In other words, this chapter
is intended to explain how each type basically works so that each type can be considered in
more detail in relation to the Base Spam System model in the fifth chapter.
3.1 Overview of Major Span Solution Activity
The spam problem really impacts everyone that uses email, which includes most people that
use the Internet. As such, many groups and individuals across the globe are actively trying to
attack this problem from a variety of angles.
The following table outlines the major spam solution activity (Table 4). Each row represents
a logically different solution type. These 21 different types are grouped into six categories
based on similarities in how they interact with the spam problem. In subsequent sections,
each category and type will be basically explained. This explanation will be enhanced in
subsequent chapters after the Base Spam System model is introduced in the next chapter.
Table 4 Maior Soam Solution Activity
A Systems Analysis of the Spam Problem
Category Name Leading Leading Implemented
Program/ Organization (1 No- 5 Yes)
Proposal
Content Rule-based SpamAssassin, The Apache 5
Filtering Filtering Brightmail Software
Anti-Spam ISP Foundation,
Brightmail, Inc.
Content Collaborative SpamNet Cloudmark, Inc. 4
Filtering Filtering
Content Client Embedded in Email Client 5
Filtering White Client Providers
Lists Software
Content Challenge/ Earthlink Earthlink, Inc. 4
Filtering Response spamBlocker
Content Client Embedded in Email Client 5
Filtering Black Client Providers
Lists Software
Access Best Practices ASTA ASTA 2
Filtering for ISPs, Technology
Businesses, & and Policy
Consumers Proposal
Access Postage Trusted-Class Goodmail Systems, 1
Filtering Costs Email Inc.
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The Implementation column (fifth) warrants some explanation. I have rated each solution
type (row) on a one to five scale on how widely deployed and available is the particular
program or proposal. This scale is as follows:
1. Not being actively pursued yet-no major proposals or significant reference
implementations.
2. Being actively pursued-major proposal and/or significant reference implementation
exists.
3. Being used in a minor way-one or more minor release implementations exist.
4. Being used in a major way-at least one major release implementation exists.
5. Widely deployed-many major release implementations exist.
Again, the following sections will describe in more detail the activity in each of the categories
(column 1) listed in the table. In this chapter, I will not, however, considerably explore the
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Access Computational n/a Microsoft 1
Filtering Costs
Access Server Bonded IronPort Systems, 5
Filtering White Lists Sender Inc.
Access Server RBL, ORDB MAPS, Inc., 5
Filtering Black Lists ORDB.org
Access Do Not Email CAN-SPAM Federal Trade 2
Filtering Registry Act of 2003 Commission
Access Reverse DNS AOL America Online, 5
Filtering Inc.
Identifiability IP Address Sender ID Microsoft/ 4
Authentication PObox.com
Identifiability Content DomainKeys Yahoo! 3
Signing
Regulation State Spam Washington Washington State 4
Protection State
Laws
Regulation Federal Spam CAN-SPAM Federal Trade 4
Protection Act of 2003 Commission
Laws
Regulation Acceptable AUPs ISPs and ESPs 5
Use Policies
International International World Summit United Nations 2
Collaboration Spam on the
Prevention Information
Laws Society
Enforcement Lawsuits AOL Legal America Online, 5
Capacity Department Inc.
Enforcement Bounty CAN-SPAM FTC 2
Capacity Act of 2003
Enforcement Vigilante ROSKO Spamhaus 5
Capacity Efforts
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success or failure of the measures, or their positive and negative effects. That discussion
exists in subsequent chapters. Therefore, the point of the following sections is to familiarize
the reader with the current anti-spam techniques and proposals, in order to better
understand the spam system that will be modeled in the next chapter.
3.2 Content Filtering
The most well known anti-spam solution category is content filtering. In this category,
solution types examine and rate each message as to whether their content appears to
resemble spam or not. If given a spam rating, then the message may be filtered in one way
or another, which could range from immediate deletion to sequestration into another area or
folder.
The most common content filtering type is rule-based content filtering. In this type, a set of
rules or tests are run against the content of the message. Each test corresponds to some
item in the message header or body that is associated with spam to some degree, e.g.
exclamation points in the subject line. If a message meets the test, a value associated with
the test is added to an overall spam score. After all the tests are run, a final spam score is
achieved, which can then be used to filter messages as desired.
There are now rule-based content filters associated with most major email clients that are
built-in to the clients. For example, all of Microsoft's major email clients, Microsoft Outlook
2003, Hotmail, and MSN, all have intrinsic filtering systems (Microsoft, 2003). There are
also many third-party filtering systems and providers as well (Open Directory, 2004). Of
particular note is an open source filter called SpamAssassin, which is widely used by smaller
ISPs and ESPs because of its open-source license (The Apache Software Foundation,
2004).21 SpamAssassin conducts a large array of tests on the message (The Apache Software
Foundation, 2004). Often programs that use SpamAssassin will set a threshold score such
that if messages get a score higher than the threshold, they are considered spam.
In addition to the static spam rules included with SpamAssassin, it also includes a Bayesian
learning filter, which enables the rule-based technique to become dynamic (Wikipedia, 2004).
Once the Bayesian filter is set up, SpamAssassin gives a probability of whether a message is
spam is not. This Bayesian filter is then updated with each message received, and learns over
time from those messages. For each message reported as spam by the user, the
characteristics associated with that message become more "spammy" in the filter, i.e.
increase the probability that future messages with similar characteristics will have a higher
spam probability. And conversely, for each message not reported as spam by the user, the
characteristics associated with that message become less "spammy" in the filter, i.e. decrease
the probability that future messages with similar characteristics will have a higher spam
probability.
Major ISPs also outsource additional rule-based content filtering on top of their in-house
filters. The leading provider is Brightmail, Inc., which includes Microsoft, AT&T, Comcast,
21 SpamAssassin is a top-level project at the Apache Software Foundation, one of the most reliable sources of
open source software and the developers of the Apache Web Server (Kerner, 2004).
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Verizon, and Earthlink among its customers.22 Brightmail has come up with some innovate
techniques to generate useful rules in addition to static spam tests and Bayesian filters. One
such technique is the creation of "spam traps;" a spam trap is an email address set up for the
sole purpose of collecting spam. Since no human exists behind these email addresses, it is
assumed that all mail received at these addresses are spam. They also have honed the system
of distributing new rules from their servers to email clients across the globe in almost real
time (Brightmail, 2003).
A variation of rule-based content filtering is collaborative content filtering. In collaborative
content filtering, messages are also filtered as to whether they are considered spam or not,
but this consideration is made by actual people in collaboration as opposed to pre-defined
rules. Some filtering software providers employ staff to mark spam messages as they come
in, and set up dynamic rules to block future messages of the same type. More distributed
approaches have been set up, however, where members of a spam filter community declare
messages as spam, and this feedback instantly promulgates throughout the other users of the
filter (Cloudmark, 2004).
Other anti-spam content filtering solution types consider specific pieces of email content as
opposed to the content of the entire message. The client white list is perhaps the most
familiar to the average reader. This technique is widely deployed and can be found in most
major email clients. All it does is ensure that mail from particular email addresses does not
get filtered and goes right through to main folders. A system where friends, family, and
colleagues get filtered into individual folders would be a variation of the client white list.
Another variation is to strictly apply the white list such that only email purported to be sent
by those email addresses on the list gets delivered to regular inboxes-all other email would
go to a junk folder.
Earthlink has taken the client white list concept one step further, and is the first major
company to employ the "challenge-response" type on a large scale (Popov, 2004). In this
type, any email that comes from someone not on a user's white list is sent an automatic reply
challenging them to identify themselves as someone that the user wants to receive email
from. If the sender responds, this response can be verified by the receiver, and if accepted,
the sender will be placed on the user's white list. Earthlink has chosen not to send
challenges to bulk mailers, however, and all this mail thus gets put in a suspect folder.
A final type in this category is client black lists or "block lists" that prevent certain senders
from sending email to non-junk folders. For senders that repeatedly use the same address,
this type serves as an easy alternative to asking the sender to stop sending email through an
opt-out process. Since it easy to create such lists within email clients, most email clients have
the ability to create client black lists.
Of all the general spam solution categories, content filtering has the most academic activity
as well as commercial activity. Such academic work centers on the best ways to tune neural
networks and Bayesian filters to detect spam as well as statistical work on how the spam
problem is progressing. There is not yet a spam journal that is dedicated to this topic, but
there have been several spam conferences where work has been presented
22 Brightmail was bought by Symantec Corporation for an estimated $370 million in 2004 (Symantec, 2004).
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(spamlinks.openrbl.org, 2004). For instance, at the Spam Conference 2004 at MIT, Terry
Sullivan presented a statistical analysis on how spam changes over time, and Shlomo
Hershkop introduced the idea of behavior based filtering where filtering could be done
based on deviations from the user's normal email receiving habits (Houbart, 2004). Industry
players like Microsoft and Brightmail, Inc., also gave talks about their latest content filtering
practices.
3.3 Access Filtering
The second category of anti-spam solution types is access filtering. In this category, solution
types attempt to block spam senders from accessing email servers, i.e. filtering access to only
legitimate senders. As such, this category is the realm of Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
and Email Service Providers (ESPs).
ISPs and ESPs face the spam problem on two fronts: (1) the more email users they have, the
more a target they are for spam; and (2) the bigger they are, the easier it is to try to send
spam from their systems because it is harder to monitor and control their systems. In 2003,
some of the largest ISPs and ESPs got together to work collaboratively on a solution and
formed a group called the Anti-Spam Technical Alliance (ASTA). This alliance includes
America Online (AOL), British Telecom (BT), Comcast, EarthLink, Microsoft, and Yahoo!.
On June 22, 2004, the first fruits of this collaboration appeared in the form of a document
entitled "Anti-Spam Technical Alliance Technology and Policy Proposal" (ASTA, 2004).
This document is intended to be a working document, and is versioned 1.0. It primarily
enumerates lists of "Best Practices" for ISPs, Bulk E-mail Senders, and Consumers. The
members have begun to implement these practices, with immediately encouraging results.
For example, Comcast began blocking outbound email for some of their broadband
customers' computers that they believe have been hijacked to send spam, and they have
reduced outbound spam from their network by an estimated 35% as a result (Hu, 2004).
This is particularly encouraging because recent estimates of spam sources indicate that up to
80% come from such hijacked machines, and Comcast is one of the largest sources of these
machines (Leyden, 2004).
The best practices in general all attempt to reduce the possibility of spammers using third-
party IP addresses to send their spam. Several practices specifically have to do with cutting
down on hijacked machine use, either by literally shutting off consumer machines from
sending bulk email in general, or by creating automated complaint systems to identify
violators more quickly in order to shut them off individually as necessary. They also
recommend better controlling of access to Web-based email accounts, such as Hotmail, so
that spammers cannot create thousands of such accounts to send millions of emails that
appear to come from the IP addresses of those services.
Other access filtering solution types include those that block access to bulk senders that do
not meet certain criteria. One such proposed type is postage costs, which is a subset of the
more general "sender pays" approach to spam where more of the costs of sending email are
shifted to the sender. The idea of postage costs is to make postage work analogously for
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email as it does for regular mail, where bulk mail senders have to pay postage that limits their
sending somewhat. As such, it would require a significant overhaul of the email sending
system to account for such charges (Rideau, 2004).
There has been much talk about postage costs, but no major proposals to speak of (Mara,
2004). However, there are small commercial vendors pushing the idea. For instance,
Goodmail Systems, Inc. has been trying to sign up major e-mail providers such as Yahoo to
charge bulk mailers a penny a message in return for a guarantee that their messages will pass
spam filters (Goodmail Systems, 2004).
Very similar to the postage costs idea is that of computational costs, where bulk senders
have to make their computers perform some computations, e.g. a complex math problem,
before sending a message. Computational costs can be thought of as a type of postage, but I
have distinguished them because postage is usually thought of as monetary. In fact, the
most press postage costs has received in recent times stems from a comment by Bill Gates in
early 2004 that was really about computational costs (Associated Press, 2004). A Microsoft
Research Team has apparently been working on this idea since 2001.
The theory behind computational costs is that just as postage would limit bulk mail sending
rates because of limited available funds by bulk mailers, so would computational costs
because time is money. Less mail could be sent from one machine due to limited
computational power, and thus more machines would need to be bought to achieve the
same sending rate. Additionally, computational costs may be theoretically easier to
implement because money does not need to be exchanged.
Perhaps the most widely deployed access filtering solutions, however, are those of server
white lists and server black lists. These lists are analogous to the client white lists and client
black lists discussed in the previous section, but these lists occur on the server. The bigger
ESPs have created "white-lists" whereby legitimate bulk email senders, e.g. Amazon.com or
Hallmark.com, can ensure their email is delivered. By itself, this would seem to make the
spam problem worse or at least just the same, but these ESPs have also turned up their
content filters for bulk senders. The result is that if you do not go through their white-listing
programs, you are significantly at risk to having your email automatically go to junk folders.
Microsoft itself claims not to have an in-house white list, and instead out-sources their white
list program to IronPort Systems' Bonded Sender Program (IronPort Systems, 2004). This
program requires bulk senders to put up a bond and have their email complaints monitored
by IronPort, which deducts money from the bond for each complaint over a threshold.
With Microsoft's endorsement, this program has become more important, with it now
covering an estimated 230 million email addresses (IronPort Systems, 2004). Many smaller
ESPs that cannot afford to institute their own processes simply out-source this mechanism
to IronPort. AOL (America Online, 2002) and Yahoo! (Yahoo, 2004) maintain their own
white list processes.
As noted, there can also be black lists at the server level, either at the sending server,
receiving server, or both. These lists try to, in real time, identify sources of spam such that
ISPs and ESPs can refuse mail from them before any content filtering takes place. There are
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many black lists, and they vary in their criteria for listing (Open Directory, 2004). Most are
based upon individual IP addresses or ranges of IP addresses.
Two lists worth mentioning are the Open Relay Database (ORDB) (Open Relay Database,
2004) that tracks unprotected mail servers and the Realtime Blackhole List (RBL) (MAPS,
2004) that tracks known sources of spam. It is somewhat unclear which lists in particular are
used by particular ISPs and ESPs, although it is known that Microsoft has used the RBL in
the past for Hotmail (Festa, 1999). When an email server uses a black list, it usually prevents
email from originating right at the beginning of the SMTP exchange, often by refusing
connections altogether, or by sending back a negative message about the block.23
Another type of access filtering is a Do-Not-E-Mail Registry, which could work analogously
to the Do-Not-Call Registry recently established in the United States (Federal Trade
Commission, 2003). There are a number of different ways the registry could work in
particular, but fundamentally it would make illegal sending unsolicited commercial email to a
large list of email addresses. In other words, it would filter access to the email addresses
listed in the registry.
In June, 2004, however, the FTC reported to Congress that they did not think the Do-Not-
Email Registry would be a good idea at the present time (Federal Trade Commission, 2004).
They concluded that because of the inability to reliably authenticate email senders and the
penchant of spammers to ignore laws and regulations, an email registry would do more harm
than good at this time. They noted that if the authentication situation were to change at
some point in the future, the idea could be revisited.
A final type of access filtering widely deployed is the reverse DNS test. DNS stands for
Domain Name System, and is the system whereby IP addresses are mapped to domain
names (Wikipedia, 2004). That is, DNS is what enables one to type in www.mit.edu into a
Web browser and consequently reach the MIT Web page. In this case, the Web browser
uses DNS to look up the IP address associated with www.mit.edu, and then connects to the
server behind that IP address to retrieve the Web page.
Reverse DNS is simply the reverse of DNS, and translates an IP address into a domain
name. The way it is used in access filtering is in the initial HELO part of the SMTP
exchange, as outlined in the last chapter. When the domain name is transmitted after the
HELO command, the email server can use reverse DNS to find out what IP address this
domain name should correspond to. If the IP address that was used to connect to the email
server does not match the IP address found through reverse DNS, then the email can be
considered suspect, and in the strictest of applications, the sender can be denied further
access to the email server (see Figure 3).
23 Black lists can also be used by email clients in this manner, which look at the received headers, and then
delete email upon receipt as identified. However, this method of implementing black lists in the client takes up
more Internet bandwidth because the email actually was transmitted and received. Additionally, it requires the
client to connect to a server to query against the latest list.
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Figure 3 Reverse DNS Test
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This method has been widely applied to high volume IP addresses or those that generate
significant complaints. AOL uses reverse DNS in this manner (America Online, 2004).
However, they stop short of strict application for all IP addresses because of a significant
problem with doing so, which will now be explored. Recall that DNS translates a domain
name, e.g. www.mit.edu, into an IP address, e.g.:
bash-2.05b$ nslookup www.mit.edu nsl.mit.edu
Server: W20NS.MIT.EDU
Address: 18.70.0.160
Name: DANDELION-PATCH.mit.edu
Address: 18.181.0.31
Aliases: www.mit.edu
In this example, the UNIX 'nslookup' command was used to ask the mit DNS server
(nsl.mit.edu) what the IP address is for www.mit.edu, and it returned '18.181.0.31'. Reverse
DNS asks the reverse question of what IP address is associated with a particular domain
name.
bash-2.05b$ nslookup 18.181.0.31 nsl.mit.edu
Server: W20NS.MIT.EDU
Address: 18.70.0.160
Name: DANDELION-PATCH.MIT.EDU
Address: 18.181.0.31
In this second example, the same command was used to ask the same DNS server what
domain name is associated with the IP address '18.181.0.31', and it returned
'DANDELION-PATCH.MIT.EDU'. This answer is unexpected since the original domain
name queried was 'www.mit.edu'. The reason for the discrepancy is that multiple domain
names can point to one IP address in DNS, but only one domain name can be returned in
the reverse DNS lookup.
In other words, the device connected to the IP address '18.181.0.31' has several domain
names associated with it, including 'www.mit.edu' and 'DANDELION-PATCH.MIT.EDU',
the latter of which is the primary domain name according to DNS. There is simply not a
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one to one mapping between IP addresses and domain names in all contexts. In situations
where this is not the case, not all email senders from those computers can meet the standard
of specifying the HELO line in such a way that it passes the reverse DNS test, and this is
why it is not strictly applied in all cases.
3.4 Identifiabiliy
The third category of anti-spam solution types is that of identifiability. In this category,
solution types attempt to more reliably identify the senders of email messages in general.
The idea is that if senders can be reliably identified, then:
1. Spam senders can be more easily traced and thus dealt with; and
2. Content and access filtering can be improved because they can be based on more
reliable sender information.
The first solution type in this category is that of IP address authentication. Recall from the
previous chapter that the IP address is currently the only piece of information provided by
the sender during the SMTP exchange that is somewhat trustworthy. IP address
authentication attempts to use that fact to restore the trust that was once shared by email
users that email received is really from who it says it is from.
There are many major proposals that are competing for implementation in this area. The
proposals have been submitted to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has a
working group to consider all the proposals and make some recommendations (Newton et
al., 2004). The two leading proposals merged into a proposal called Sender ID (Microsoft,
2004). The proposals that merged were Sender Policy Framework (SPF) by Meng Wong
from pobox.com and Caller ID by Microsoft (IC Group, 2004). AOL and many other
domains have become early adopters of this system (America Online, 2004).
All of these proposals basically work the same way, which will now be briefly explained.
They use DNS and the reverse DNS concept of publishing some information in DNS that
the email server or client can then use to authenticate the sender via their IP address. The
main difference between the proposals and the regular reverse DNS test is that the proposals
authenticate parts of the messages, while the reverse DNS test authenticates just the IP address
that is connecting to the email server.
For example, the from (sender's) email address can be used. In this case, the domain part of
the address is first extracted. The sender would have previously published in their public
DNS record which IP addresses are authorized to send email for the domain extracted.
Those authorized IP addresses are then looked up through DNS. If there is a match, then
the message passes; otherwise, the message can be considered suspect (see Figure 4).
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A similar type to IP address authentication is that of content signing. The leading content
signing proposal has been put forth by Yahoo! and is entitled DomainKeys (Yahoo, 2004).
Instead of publishing in DNS the IP addresses a domain is allowed to send from,
DomainKeys has one publish a public encryption key, which is part of a public/private key
pair that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages (Wikipedia, 2004).
When messages are sent from a domain, the sender or their email server uses the private key
associated with that domain to create a digital signature of the message, and stores this digital
signature in the header of the message. Then the email server that receives the message
attempts to verify this signature using the public key in DNS associated with the domain of
the 'from' address of the message. Again, if there is a match then the message passes, and
otherwise it can be considered suspect (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 Content Signing
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Yahoo! has also submitted their proposal to the IETF, and is working with Sendmail, Inc.,
the maker of the most popular email server, to develop a reference implementation (Delany,
2004). Eric Allman, the CTO of Sendmail, Inc., has indicated that Sendmail will support all
authentication schemes that gain traction (Lang, 2004).
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Content signing is thus similar in basic structure and result to IP Address Authentication-
they both attempt to authenticate emails by comparing something given by the sender with
specific parts of messages received, and they both are after this same result of increased
trust. However, they are not mutually exclusive such that both could be used against a
particular message in conjunction.
Both Sender ID and DomainKeys also resolve the aforementioned problem with the
traditional reverse DNS check. They do this by avoiding the traditional reverse DNS call,
and instead use additional information in regular DNS for authentication. Consider the
problem case before of multiple domains behind one IP address. With these new proposals,
each of those domains can publish their own IP addresses and/or public keys in DNS, and
some program wishing to authenticate them can find the information associated with the
particular domain in question.
3.5 Regulation
The fourth category of anti-spam solution types is that of regulation. This category includes
public laws as well as private contracts that prohibit spam techniques. Many US states have
laws on the books that apply to spam in one way or another. General laws include
consumer protection and computer fraud codes, which sending spam often violates. Nevada
was the first state to enact a spam law in particular (in 1997), and many other states followed
in their footsteps (Sorkin, 2004). Most of these laws contain similar provisions, which are
summarized below.
* They may outlaw falsified routing information, such as faking the sender email
address or "spoofing" the IP address.
* They may require that unsolicited commercial email be labeled with a particular tag,
e.g. "ADV:", in the subject line.
* They may require that unsolicited sexually explicit email be labeled with a particular
tag, e.g. "ADV:ADULT", in the subject line.
* They may prohibit misleading or fraudulent message subjects or bodies.
* They may require "opt-out" instructions that enable Consumers to stop receiving
messages from a particular mailing list or sender.
* They may require a valid "reply-to" address, postal address, or phone number so that
Consumers can get in touch with the sender if desired.
However, due to the cost of identifying spammers and jurisdictional problems, not many
cases have been brought against spammers under these laws. The most notable states that
have taken quite active positions are the Washington State (Washington Office of the
Attorney General., 2004) and Virginia (Virginia Office of the Attorney General, 2004). Both
states enforce their spam laws via their Attorneys General's offices.
One notable case resulted in the first significant jail sentence for a spammer. The New York
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer convicted a spammer under the state's identity theft
law, resulting in 3.5 to 7 years of imprisonment, which is the maximum allowed under the
law given the defendant's prior record (Roberts, 2004).
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The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 pre-empted state spam laws (except their anti-fraud
provisions), and in so doing, became the primary law in the United States in terms of directly
regulating spam. This law incorporated much of the common provisions in the state laws,
including the following.
* Requiring unsolicited commercial email to have opt-out methods.
* Requiring unsolicited commercial email to include the sender's physical address.
* Prohibiting deceptive subject lines.
* Prohibiting false headers.
* Requiring labeling of sexually explicit email (Federal Trade Commission, 2004).
The Act does not go so far as to prohibit unsolicited commercial email in general, nor does it
apply to non-commercial spam. Furthermore, it is to be expected that the law will not make
much of a difference until it is significantly enforced. Enforcement, as stipulated by the Act,
is directed by the FTC or by willing ISPs. The FTC filed its first suit under the law in April
2004 (Federal Trade Commission, 2004). The law actually took effect on January 1, 2004.
ISPs, namely AOL and Microsoft have also filed several suits and are expected to be among
the main enforcers of the law.
The proposed sentencing guidelines associated with the law are rather steep, and include
imprisonment for up to five (5) years for some violations (United States Sentencing
Commiission, 2004, pg. 155). While no one has yet faced this type of punishment under this
law, the FBI has told Congress it has identified about 100 significant targets, and is actively
working to bring them to justice (McCullagh, 2004).
Furthermore, many countries besides the United States have enacted their own spam laws
(Sorkin, 2004). The particular provisions vary from country to country. One notable
difference that has been talked about considerably in the press is that the EU laws require
commercial senders to get recipients to opt-in before sending, while the US law does not
(messagelabs.com, 2004). Since spam is an international problem, these differences cause
considerable trouble for compliance by global companies, but are largely ignored by more
lawless spammers.
In addition to public laws, each ISP and ESP has developed their own anti-spam regulations
to help combat spam, which are usually written into their Acceptable Use Policies (AUP).
ISP and ESP AUPs, for the most part, all prohibit spam, giving them the ability to terminate
accounts if they feel customers are sending significant amounts of spam. In conjunction
with AUPs, these organizations generally have set up complaint systems whereby their email
customers can report spam. These complaints get sent to some centralized location, where
they can be aggregated in order to try to identify the most egregious perpetrators.
3.6 International Collaboration
International collaboration is the fifth category of anti-spam solution types. The result of
such collaboration would be some type of regulation, which is the fourth category. I have
included international collaboration as its own category because it cuts down on the ability
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for spam senders to escape regulation by moving jurisdictions. There has not yet been much
international collaboration to speak of, however.
The UN has decided to get involved in this issue, but at a rather slow pace. The General
Assembly adopted resolution 56/183 in 2001 that called for a world summit on the
information society to be held in two phases (United Nations, 2002). The first phase was
held (December 2003) in Geneva, Switzerland and resulted in a Declaration of Principles
and a Plan of Action (World Summit on the Information Society, 2004). In the Plan of
Action document, spam received this mention: "[t]ake appropriate action on spam at
national and international levels." While this is not very specific, it does indicate that there
exists support to work on this problem via international consensus.
3.7 Enforcement Capadiy
The final and sixth listed category of anti-spam solution types is that of enforcement
capacity. In this category, solution types attempt to increase the enforcement of existing
regulations. The most obvious way this is done is through lawsuits. States taking spammers
to court under criminal codes has already been mentioned. In addition to those criminal
lawsuits, Microsoft and the bigger ISPs and ESPs have also been taking their spam problems
to court via civil suits.
On March 10, 2004, Microsoft, AOL, Earthlink, and Yahoo! jointly announced legal suits in
federal courts in California, Georgia, Virginia, and Washington State. These suits were filed
under the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-
SPAM) Act of 2003, which as noted, took effect January 1, 2004 (United States of America,
2003). These were over 200 separate cases, although most of them were filed against "John
Does" because the identities of the alleged perpetrators are unknown. More cases of a
similar nature have followed since then and are expected to continue.
These suits and the ones mentioned in previous sections are not the first spam suits to be
filed, however. AOL has been perhaps the most active legally, and has been filing suits since
at least 1996 (America Online, 2003). Some of these suits are under state spam laws, and
others are under consumer protection laws and in some cases tort common law.
One notable recent case in this latter category was a case brought by Intel alleging a former
employee committed a tortuous trespass when he sent bulk email to Intel employees. The
case made its way up to the California Supreme Court, which decided against Intel claiming
that Intel did not show real property damage required for liability under the trespass to
chattels cause of action sought (Boulton, 2003).
Sometimes, however, suits are foregone by vigilantes attempting to take the law into their
own hands and shutting down spam senders through private enforcement. Vigilante efforts
are really a catch-all for the attempts by spam receivers to stop receiving spam beyond the
more traditional techniques they have at their disposal. These efforts include:
· Attempting to identify the true senders of spam.
· Reporting spam messages to ISPs, ESPs, and governmental authorities.
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* Spamming back the people they believe are spamming them.
* Posting spam received to public newsgroups and Web sites.
* Attempting to publicly shame senders of spam.
* Creating customer service nightmares for senders of spam.
* Denial of Service attacks of Web sites and servers associated with spam sending.
In general, these efforts are designed to increase the "cost" of sending spam by adding some
more friction to the system. However, vigilante efforts can easily escalate across the line into
illegality (Hollander, 2004) as well as cause trouble for innocent bystanders (Fausett, 2004).
For instance, vigilantes have been known to break laws, even spam laws, in the process of
trying to stop spam senders. Also, less sophisticated vigilantes often falsely attack innocent
third-party victims of identity theft by spam senders. However, when carefully controlled,
these efforts can be quite useful. The most notable example of useful collaborative vigilante
effort is the Spamhaus Registry Of Known Spam Operations (ROSKO), which compiles
evidence of spam operations for use in court or otherwise (Spamhaus, 2004).
A final type of solution that attempts to increase enforcement capacity is that of a bounty
system. The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 instructs the FTC to consider such a system
(Brunker, 2004). As Brunker explains in an MSNBC article:
As outlined in CAN-Spam, the bounty system would offer a person who first identifies
someone violating the law's provisions a reward of "not less than 20 percent of the total civil
penalty collected" by the FTC.
The FTC is compiling and reviewing expert testimony on the bounty plan and will report
back to Congress by September on whether the idea is viable. The study was mandated by a
little-noticed 1 lth-hour addition to the law by Sen. Jon Corzine, D-N.J., and Rep. Zoe
Lofgren, D-Calif.
The system was originally proposed by Stanford Professor Lawrence Lessig, and would
essentially legitimize most vigilante efforts, and would further incentive these efforts with
monetary payouts. The policy would effectively try to reroute consumer technical expertise
(and time) to help the FTC identify spammers. Not surprisingly, email marketers are not too
fond of the idea (Fadner, 2004).
3.8 Spam Solution Activity Summarized
As you can see from the above sections, there are a myriad of approaches to solving the
spam problem, including technical, legal and policy oriented approaches. A summary can be
found in the first section (see Table 4).
When reading through these different approaches, one can become overwhelmed with the
depth and breadth of activity taking place. However, I will show that this solution activity
can be rather easily placed within a relatively simple model of the spam system.
Many of the solutions are similar in the pressures they put on this system, and that is why
they have been grouped into a smaller number of spam solution categories in this chapter.
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These categories prove useful when thinking about an effective spam solution strategy. In
the next chapter, the model of the Base Spam System will be introduced.
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4 Base Spam System
In this chapter, a model of the Base Spam System is presented, which is a pictorial model of
the causes and effects that comprise the intrinsic dynamics of the spam problem (see Figure
6). This model will be used in the next chapter to more thoroughly evaluate the solution
activity presented in the last chapter.
Figure 6 Base Spam System
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This model of the Base Spam System is intended to be the central contribution of this thesis.
It stems from recognition that the spam problem is really a complex system, and it is an
attempt to capture the complexity of that system. The major insight is that, once the system
is depicted, one can begin to think about solutions to the spam problem in a holistic manner.
That is, one can use the Base Spam System model to evaluate how specific solution activity
might affect the spam problem, which is done in the next chapter.
The primary desired properties of the model are:
* To be able to visually communicate the complexities of the spam problem.
* To be able to expand the model to include complexities that may arise in the future.
* To be able to evaluate spam solution activity.
* To be able to analyze the spam problem both qualitatively and quantitatively as
needs arise.
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These properties led to a choice to model the Base Spam System in the form of a causal loop
diagram, which is a type of diagram used in the discipline of system dynamics. That
methodology will now be explained, and then the model will be presented thereafter.
4.1 Causal Loop Methodology
The causal loop diagram is a methodology used in the discipline of system dynamics. It is a
diagram of a system comprised of the variables of that system linked together to depict the
causal loops and linkages in the system. Perhaps the best introductory explanation of the
causal loop methodology is from John Sterman's book Business Dynamics:
A causal diagram consists of variables connected by arrows denoting the causal influences
among the variables. The important feedback loops are also identified in the diagram...
Variables are related by causal links, shown by arrows. ... Each causal link is assigned
a polarity, either positive (+) or negative (-) to indicate how the dependent variable changes
when the independent variable changes....
A positive link means that if the cause increases, the effect increases above what it
would otherwise have been, and if the cause decreases, the effect decreases below what it would
otherwise have been...
A negative link means that if the cause increases, the effect decreases below what it
would otherwise have been, and if the cause decreases, the effect increases above what it would
otherwise have been...
Link polarities describe the structure of the system. They do not describe the
behavior of the variables. That is, they describe what would happen IF there were a change.
They do not describe what actually happens...
... When assessing the actual behavior of a system, all variables interact
simultaneously (all else not equal) and computer simulation is usually needed to trace out the
behavior of the system and determine which loops are dominant. (Sterman, 2000, p. 138-
140, emphasis kept from the original text)
The causal loop methodology closely aligns with the desired properties of the model stated
in the last section. Casual loop diagrams are designed to communicate complexity visually.
And because of their pictorial nature, they are easily expanded or changed to adapt to
changing realities or to include additional behavior such as the side effects of spam solution
activity. The diagram itself is qualitative in nature; however, the linkages between the
variables imply quantitative relationships. These relationships can be studied in future work.
There are two important things to keep in mind when thinking about causal loop diagrams
in general and the model of the Base Spam System in particular. First, the model is not
verified to be complete in a theoretical sense. Instead, it is complete in an empirical sense in
that it has captured all of the causes and effects observed to date. To the extent that more
causes and effects are observed, the model can be easily expanded to include them.
Second, the variables in the model are a choice. The model depicts causal linkages and
loops, and those underlying causal chains can be depicted in a number of ways, each using a
different set of variables depending on how detailed one wants to be with regards to
intermediate causal steps and which of those steps one wants to highlight. In this model, the
variables have been chosen in order to best simply communicate the complexities of the
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spam problem. That is, the particular variables (and their names) have been selected to
create a model that is as easy to understand as possible.
I believe that the best way to grasp the causal loop methodology is through example. This
chapter provides many examples, building up the model that is the Base Spam System in
steps, starting with the central Spam Ratio variable in the next section.
4.2 Spam Ratio
Recall that the spam ratio is the metric introduced in Chapter 1 to evaluate the spam
problem for a particular user of email. This ratio is the amount of spam received divided by
the total amount of email received. The central variable of the model of the Base Spam
System is the Spam Ratio in the aggregate, i.e. the total amount of spam received across the
Internet divided by the total amount of email received across the Internet (see Figure 7).
Figure 7 Spam Ratio
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Two variables directly influence the Spam Ratio, which you can see in the model by the two
arrows pointing to it. These variables are Spam Sent and Non-Spam Sent. The plusses and
minuses explain the direction, or polarity, of the influences. For instance, as Non-Spam Sent
increases, all other things constant, the Spam Ratio decreases. Similarly, as Spam Sent
increases, all other things constant, the Spam Ratio increases. Since I will be explaining
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many linkages like these, please assume that when I am talking about the relationship
between two variables, all other variables are held constant
There are two other effects between the Spam Ratio and Non-Spam Sent that are also
depicted. First, as the Spam Ratio increases, there is more and more spam in recipient
inboxes. This means that more time must be spent dealing with this spam, which decreases
the Desire to Use Email in general. Another way to look at this phenomenon is that if the
time spent on email remains constant, and there is more spam, less time can be used for
sending Non-Spam, which is the desired use of email.
In any case, an increase in the Spam Ratio decreases the Desire to Use Email variable, which
decreases Non-Spam Sent, and in turn, increases the Spam Ratio further. In the figure, this
loop is identified with the title Loss of Usability. Next to the loop label is a curved arrow,
describing the direction in which the loop occurs. The plus inside the curved arrow
indicates that the loop is a reinforcing loop. That is, the result of the causal loop is a
reinforcement of the original change, i.e. an increase or decrease in the Spam Ratio.
The second loop in the figure, identified with the label Loss of Trust, has the same net effect
as the first loop but for different reasons. Recall that most spam employs fraudulent tactics
in an attempt to hide the identity of the sender. These tactics often involve using other
peoples' identities. In the aggregate, this leads to a general loss in trust that a given email is
who it says it is from. From the perspective of non-spam senders, this leads to a decrease in
the expectation that their email will be perceived correctly, noted by the Expectation Email
Perceived Correctly variable. In turn, this leads to less non-spam being sent because
legitimate senders have less trust that their non-spam will be perceived by recipients in a
useful manner.
Therefore, as the Spam Ratio increases, the Expectation Email Perceived Correctly variable
decreases, which decreases the Non-Spam Sent variable, and in turn, further increases the
Spam Ratio. As such, this loop is also a reinforcing loop. Perhaps the best example of this
loop is firms that have been major victims of spam identity theft scams. These firms may be
more reluctant to communicate with their customers via email, in fear of simply exacerbating
their email problems. Instead, they may opt to have their customers log in to their accounts,
and then distribute news and information through their Web sites.
Finally, note that the denominator and numerator of the Spam Ratio involve email received
and not email sent. In the model, however, the variables that impact the Spam Ratio are
Spam Sent and Non-Spam Sent. These variables equal Spam Received and Non-Spam
Received when there is no filtering taking place, and are greater than Spam Received and
Non-Spam Received when filtering exists.
Yet the influences are the same. Consider that some percentage of all email sent is received,
depending on the percentage of email filtered. Therefore, as Spam Sent increases, so does
Spam Received (the percentage that gets through), and in turn, the Spam Ratio increases. In
other words, it does not matter in terms of correctness whether Spam Sent or Spam
Received is used as the variable.
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However, I believe the choice of Spam Sent and Non-Spam Sent is better for two reasons.
First, it allows for filtering to be considered more intricately, as will be done in the next
chapter. Also, Spam Sent and Non-Spam Sent are clearer because they more basically
correspond to actions taken in the real world, and therefore are easier to understand.
4.3 Spam Sent
As mentioned, one of the main variables influencing the Spam Ratio is Spam Sent. Two
variables directly influence Spam Sent: Spam Capacity and Desire to Spam. Both Spam
Capacity and Desire to Spam independently influence Spam Sent, and are thus depicted
independently in the model. One way to see why the distinction matters is to consider that
many people have the capacity to spam, but no desire to spam, and those people do not
increase Spam Sent. Similarly, there are those that have desire to spam, but no spam
capacity, and those people do not increase Spam Sent. But if someone has a slight capacity,
and then his/her desire to spam increases dramatically, we can expect that Spam Sent will
increase since he/she will spend more time to use his/her current capacity to increase Spam
Sent given his/her strong desire.
This section considers the drivers of Spam Sent. First, consider a primary reinforcing loop
of the Spam Sent variable via Spam Capacity, namely Ability to Spam (see Figure 8).
Figure 8 Ability to Spam
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Spam Capacity is directly affected by Access to Methods such that as Access to Methods
increases, Spam Capacity does so in turn. The methods contained within the Access to
Methods variable include any method used by spam senders, including all of the techniques
outlined in Table 3 (from Chapter 2) used to hide identity. Fundamentally, access to these
methods requires money. This does not necessarily mean that spam senders need to pay
others for access; they could just need money to free up their time so that they can learn to
access the methods themselves. In any case, Access to Methods can increase as a result of
Profits increasing. Note that it is not just money that drives Access to Methods, but Profits,
because without profiting from Spam Sent, spam senders would rather spend their money
on more profitable activities.
Continuing to follow the loop around backwards, we see that as Responses increases, so
does Profits in turn. Responses is an absolute measure of the responses that people make
from Spam Sent to spam senders that generate Profits. Finally, as Spam Sent increases, so
do Responses, because as there is more and more Spam, there will be me more and more
Responses, assuming a non-zero response rate and all other variables held constant.
This loop, in and of itself, is reinforcing because an increase in Spam Sent would serve to
increase Spam Sent indefinitely absent other effects. This may seem like it is the case as
Spam Sent has increased steadily, but we know that Spam cannot increase indefinitely. As
such, there is a balancing loop, labeled Saturation in the model.
The Saturation loop includes the Response Rate variable, which is simply the percentage (%)
rate of response from Spam Sent. As the Response Rate increases, so does Responses. Yet
as Spam Sent increases, the Response Rate actually decreases because those responding have
simply more offers to consider. This saturation behavior is a familiar economic concept
seen in traditional advertising and other markets.
Next, let us concentrate on Profits and expand our thinking on this variable (see Figure 9).
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The Innovation loop depicts how an increase in Profits can indirectly increase Access to
Methods in addition to direct ways such as freeing up time and paying others already
mentioned. In this loop, some Profits are allocated towards Research and Development
(R&D) such that as Profits increase, all other things held constant, so does R&D. In turn,
R&D results in wholly new methods that spammers then have access to. This loop is similar
to R&D present in manufacturing companies where some portion of their profits is
expended to improve on old methods and come up with new manufacturing methods.
Profits also influence the Desire to Spam variable with a positive polarity. Note that there
are other variables that may increase or decrease Desire to Spam, but all other things held
constant, an increase in Profits from spamming will lead to increase in Desire to Spam as
more of those Profits from spamming are sought. Such an increase in desire leads to an
increase in Spam Sent both directly and indirectly. The direct link is noted by the loop
labeled Motivation in the model, capturing the act of an increase in motivation to use
existing methods more in response to increasing desire.
The indirect link is noted by the loop labeled Initiative in the model, capturing the act of
taking initiative in response to increasing desire. As the Desire to Spam variable increases,
so does the R&D variable in turn, as the increased Desire to Spam translates into action.
That is, not only does an increase in Desire to Spam directly increase Spam Sent, but it also
indirectly increases Spam Sent via Spam Capacity as some of that increase in desire is
funneled into coming up with new methods to spam.
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4.4 Social Reaction
Thus far, we have primarily considered loops that work to reinforce the central Spam Ratio
variable.24 We now turn to the major balancing loops that serve to balance these reinforcing
loops. This section considers the loop identified as Social Reaction (see Figure 10).
Figure 10 Social Reaction
aim N * .n --- S n/; 7~ s h
Rec/ Cof y3e. tc' Lc a( A
.- r U i Re
't
-r
l
/
. .. * , ,.......N... .. . /,rq .'.:
; ..... ;#...... /, il& P:ierceive f: ces
4 \ a.> ...
As the Spam Ratio increases, so does Recipient Concern for the spam problem. Increased
Recipient Concern brings media coverage and a general negative feeling towards those that
send spam. From the perspective of the spam sender, an increase in Recipient Concern, all
other things constant, increases Spammer Alienation. Those who send spam are thus less
likely to want to talk about what they do, and are more likely to engage in further activity to
hide their identities and spamming from those around them. Few people desire to live an
alienated lifestyle, and thus, all other things constant, and increase in Spammer Alienation
leads to a decrease in Desire to Spam. As Desire to Spam decreases, as we have seen, Spam
Sent decreases, and in turn, the Spam Ratio decreases, balancing the original supposed
increase.
24 The only balancing loop we have considered is the Saturation loop.
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4.5 Regulation
The other major balancing loops relate to the variable of Regulation. As Recipient Concern
increases, Regulation increases in response to this concern. Regulation includes not only
public laws, but also private contracts that are related to spam sending, such as the
Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) agreed to by customers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
and Email Service Providers (ESPs).
First, consider the balancing loop labeled Regulative Reaction (see Figure 11). As Regulation
increases, Enforcement Capacity increases as well. Enforcement Capacity includes not only
authorization to enforce from Regulation, but also the capacity to enforce in terms of
resources needed such as manpower, knowledge, funds, etc.
Figure 11 Regulative Reaction
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As Enforcement Capacity increases, Enforcement Success increases, and as Enforcement
Success increases, Perceived Consequences increases. The Perceived Consequences variable
is related to the fines, jail time, and black listing that may result from lawsuits and private
enforcement. In other words, as Enforcement Success increases, so does Perceived
Consequences, which in turn, decreases Desire to Spam. As we saw in the last section, a
decrease in Desire to Spam results in a decrease in Spam Sent that leads to a decrease in the
Spam Ratio, which balances the original supposed increase in Spam Ratio that fueled the
Regulation.
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The two other loops in the figure reinforce and balance the Regulative Reaction loop. The
loop labeled International Problem balances an increase in Perceived Consequences due to
an increase in Enforcement Success. To see this loop in practice, consider Enforcement
Success of the US federal spam law increasing dramatically, which would increase Perceived
Consequences for those operating in the jurisdiction covered by the law. One way for
spammers to lessen this effect on Perceived Consequences is to move overseas in an attempt
to escape US prosecution. Such movement is captured in the Move to Less Regulated Areas
variable, which when increased, leads to a decrease in Enforcement Capacity.
The loop labeled Precedent reinforces Enforcement Capacity as a result of an increase in
Enforcement Success. Discrete increases in Enforcement Success are particular private or
public cases against spammers that result in some consequences for those spam senders.
Each successful case makes the next analogous case easier to pursue and win. That is,
successful cases define precedents that increase Enforcement Capacity.
The other highlighted variable in the figure is that of Legal Protections, which balances
Regulation. While Regulation can and is created as a result of Recipient Concern, such
Regulation has limits, namely those created by Legal Protections. In the US, there are
constitutional protections that limit the extent of federal and other laws. For example, free
speech protection written into the First Amendment to the US Constitution has a direct
effect on what kind of spam legislation can be created. State and other countries'
constitutions can have similar effects.
Finally, consider the loop labeled Regulative Restriction (see Figure 12). This is the other
major balancing loop that results from the Regulation variable. Regulation, by definition,
restricts behavior, and in this case, such restriction is related to Access to Methods. An
increase in Regulation thus results in a decrease in Access to Methods, which decreases
Spam Capacity. As we have seen, a decrease in Spam Capacity decreases Spam Sent, which
balances the Spam Ratio increase that initiated the original increase in Regulation.
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4.6 Base Spam Systen
At this point, we have seen all the different pieces of the Base Spam System, which are the
variables connected together by cause and effect that comprise the spam problem. By
"base," I mean the intrinsic dynamics of the spam problem. Since many loops and variables
have been discussed so far in this chapter, I think it is important to engage in a short recap
given the complete model of the Base Spam System (see Figure 13). At the center is the
central Spam Ratio variable, with Non-Spam Sent and Spam Sent connected to it in the
described manner. Then affecting Spam Sent, is Spam Capacity and Desire to Spam, both
with positive polarity.
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Figure 13 Base Spam System
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The loops identified as Ability to Spam and Motivation drive Spam Capacity and Desire to
Spam, respectively. Additionally, they are both balanced indirectly by the loop identified as
Saturation, which influences Responses, and in turn, Profits. Profits also directly drive the
Innovation loop, and indirectly the Initiative loop via Desire to Spam.
And then there is the major balancing loop of Social Reaction related to Spammer
Alienation. Finally, there are the loops discussed in the last section related to Regulation.
The Regulative Restriction loop balances the Spam Ratio via Access to Methods, and the
Regulative Reaction loop does so via Perceived Consequences. The International Problem
and Precedent loops further influence this Regulative Reaction loop.
As mentioned, what can be added to this model of the Base Spam System are the effects
from the spam solution activity outlined in the last chapter. Those effects will be the subject
of the following chapter. Before we discuss that activity, however, we can step back and ask
a more fundamental question, namely: what are the levers that can be pulled in the Base
Spam System that would influence the Spam Ratio positively or negatively, either indirectly
or directly?
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4.7 Base Spam System Levers
Consider the variables in the model of the Base Spam System that can be altered by external
forces (see Figure 14). These variables are effectively levers that can be pulled by spam
solutions or otherwise to influence the system and thus the spam problem.
Figure 14 Base Spam System Levers
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When one first examines the model for possible levers, one might think that every variable is
a lever. For example, one might imagine decreasing Spam Capacity or Desire to Spam
directly, or for that matter, decreasing Spam Sent directly, which straightforwardly influences
the Spam Ratio. But upon further examination, one sees that those variables are not directly
movable from the outside, and instead must be dealt with indirectly.
Consider Spam Sent, which is a variable fundamentally driven by spammers out in the real
world sending spam. Unless one can physically stop spam senders from typing on their
computers, then one can not really directly influence Spam Sent from the outside. Instead,
what one can do is influence another variable that influences Spam Sent, such as Access to
Methods.
Similarly, one cannot realistically influence Desire to Spam directly from the outside, which
would involve physically changing the emotion of desire within the mind of spammers.
Instead, one can raise awareness of the problem by increasing Recipient Concern, which in
turn, would increase Spammer Alienation, and finally decrease Desire to Spam as wanted.
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Likewise, instead of influencing Spam Capacity directly, one can decrease spammers' Access
to Methods, which would in turn, influence their Spam Capacity in the desired direction.
Recipient Concern and Access to Methods are indeed two of the levers identified, Levers H
and B, respectively. A third lever, and perhaps the most obvious point of external influence,
is to decrease the Spam Ratio directly by attempting to remove spam before it reaches the
inbox, but after it is sent. This is the arena of content filtering and occurs as a result of
pulling Lever A.
A fourth lever, Lever C, involves influencing the Response Rate variable. Doing so is similar
to influencing Recipient Concern, and in fact efforts to do one may spill over into the other.
For example, decreasing Response Rate involves convincing those who are responding to
spam to stop responding to spam, or at least decrease their response rate in the aggregate. A
similar lever is Lever D, which is also about educating people. In this case, pulling Lever D
involves educating spam senders about the consequences of their actions, which in effect,
influences the Perceived Consequences variable from the outside.
The other levers (E, F, and G) involve the left side of the figure and the regulative process.
One might be inclined to say one can increase Enforcement Success directly, but this is not
realistic. Enforcement Success depends on the workings of established processes, and
cannot be easily influenced directly.25 Instead, we can think about enacting new Regulation
(Lever G), which directly increases Enforcement Capacity, which in turn eventually leads to
the desired effects on Enforcement Success.
One can also imagine influencing Enforcement Capacity directly (Lever F) through helping
enforcement efforts by allocating more resources towards enforcement, for example.
Finally, we can also attempt to counter act the International Problem directly by attempts to
directly decrease the Move to Less Regulated Areas variable (Lever E), through international
treaty, for example. In the next chapter, we consider pulling these levers in a useful manner
with regards to the spam problem.
25 One way Enforcement Success might be directly influenced, for example, is in the bribing of judges.
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5 Spam Solution Interactions with the Base Spam System
In the previous chapter, I presented a model of the Base Spam System. With that tool at our
disposal, we can begin to make sense of the major spam solution activities presented in
Chapter 3 in terms of how they interact with the Base Spam System model. I will first
reintroduce the spam solution categories. Then I will examine in more depth the
interactions of each category with the model. In so doing, this fifth chapter uses the model
to qualitatively evaluate spam solution types.
5.1 Spam Solution Activity Revisited
The following table (Table 5) re-lists the major spam solution types as presented in Chapter
3 (see Table 4) grouped by their categories as presented in that chapter. What is added is the
second column, which reinforces why the category lines were drawn this way. One can see
now that the reason for grouping the solution types in this manner is because the types
within a given category interact with the Base Spam System similarly. In particular, each type
within the same category pulls the same levers. I will now present each category in detail.
Table 5 Maior SDam Solution Tvnes Revisited
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Categogry Lver(s) Pulled Types
Content Lever A: Spam Ratio Rule-based Filtering
Filtering Collaborative Filtering
Client White Lists
Challenge / Response
Client Black Lists
Access Filtering Lever B: Access to Methods Best Practices
Postage Costs
Computational Costs
Server White Lists
Server Black Lists
Do Not Email Registry
Reverse DNS
Identifiability Lever B: Access to Methods IP Address Authentication
Lever F: Enforcement Capacity Content Signing
Regulation Lever G: Regulation State Spam Protection Laws
Federal Spam Protection Laws
Acceptable Use Policies
International Lever G: Regulation International Spam Protection
Collaboration Lever E: Move to Less Regulated Laws
Areas
Enforcement Lever F: Enforcement Capacity Lawsuits
Capacity Bounty
Vigilante Efforts
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5.2 Content Filtering
As noted in Chapter 3, content filtering solutions attempt to declare messages as spam or
not based on their content, and then filter them appropriately. With regards to the model,
this type of action pulls Lever A, i.e. is an attempt to influence the Spam Ratio directly. In
these cases, the alleged spam has already been sent. Then when the email arrives, alleged
spam is filtered, reducing the Spam Ratio. Let me just briefly review how each of the
solutions grouped into this category go about this task.
* Rule-based Filtering uses rules to declare what is spam or not via software.
* Collaborative Filtering relies on community processes in conjunction with collaborative
software to declare what is spam or not.
* Client White Lists look at email headers, and decrease the probability that non-spam
gets filtered.
* Challenge / Response sends challenges to all senders and then filters all email that do
not have valid responses associated with them.
* Client Black Lists look at email headers to filter known bad senders.
When these methods work successfully, a reduction in the Spam Ratio is achieved (see
Figure 15).
Figure 15 Content Filtering Effects
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When the Spam Ratio decreases, the model predicts such a change will directly influence
three other variables. First, we can expect both the Expectation Email Perceived Correctly
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and the Desire to Use Email variables to increase, which result in increasing Non-Spam Sent
and eventually in another decrease in the Spam Ratio. That is, these loops, being reinforcing
loops, reinforce our change and magnify it for the better. At the same time, as the Spam
Ratio is reduced, Recipient Concern for the spam problem is also reduced. As this happens,
we also expect less Regulation and Spammer Alienation to result, which could eventually
lead to more Spam Sent, as the Social Reaction, Regulative Reaction, and Regulative
Restriction loops take effect.
Whether the Spam Ratio actually is reduced after the system reacts to our initial change in
this variable is unclear, and depends on the relative ratios between the effects mentioned.
What complicates this picture even further is that pulling Lever A leads to side effects not
present in the Base Spam System. To bear these out, let us add to this discussion all the
possible interactions with the Spam System that can result from influencing the Spam Ratio
directly (see Figure 16).
Figure 16 Content Filtering Side Effects
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First, consider the loop labeled False Positives (top left), which has an opposite polarity to
that of the Loss of Trust and Loss of Usability loops just discussed. A false positive, as
mentioned in Chapter 1, is a scientific term that means marking something as positive in a
test when it should really have been marked as negative. In relation to the spam problem
and content filtering, this means filtering non-spam, i.e. wanted, messages. As mentioned
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before, false positives directly translate into lost revenue for commercial email and can cause
personal problems for personal email.
Additionally, as shown in Chapter 1, false positives are afundamental problem with applying a
spam definition in an ex ante fashion, e.g. content filtering. That is, this loop cannot be
erased while content filtering is in place. Doing so would require an ideal definition of spam
that we have already shown is unachievable. Therefore, to the extent that false positives are
created by content filtering, we expect a decrease in the Expectation Email Delivered
variable because non-spam senders are now worried that their email may become false
positives. As a result, we expect Non-Spam Sent to decrease, which counteracts our original
decrease in the Spam Ratio. Of course, this effect can be mitigated by reducing false
positives, or more accurately, the perceived rate of false positives.
The second side effect depicted (bottom) is a loop identified as Arms Race. As content
filtering technology has progressed, ways to get around the content filters have progressed in
lock-step. There are countless ways to "trick" the filters that are always changing, which is
one driver behind the ever-changing nature of spam described in Chapter 1. Some current
ways to trick content filters are misspelling words, using random words or phrases,
pretending to be random people, and sending email with just an image.
This Arms Race effect is anotherfundamental problem with content filtering because content
filtering provides both incentives to beat the filters and the opportunity to do so. The
incentives are obvious; the opportunity exists because one can easily test whether messages
are being filtered or not (by sending email to test accounts), and then change the messages in
question until they are no longer being filtered.
Moreover, this Arms Race is simply exacerbated by the low costs of sending email
mentioned earlier. As more and more spam messages are filtered, at the same time, more
and more spam messages are sent. Since the costs are so low, it is really no problem for
senders to buy a few more computers and send a few more million messages a day. This is
one of the reasons why I believe that spam senders often send what appears to be the same
message several times in close time proximity-the messages may actually be slightly
different in one way or another (at the very least in time) and the sender hopes that one or
more of them will get through the content filtering processes in place.
The third side effect (right) is positive, however. It is labeled Stratification because over time
content filtering can have the effect of stratifying spam senders from non-spam senders.
That is, the Arms Race is driven by attempts to bypass the solution, i.e. the content filters.
These attempts to bypass cause spam senders to change the messages they send. Yet to the
extent that false positives are kept to a minimum, we expect only spam senders, i.e. those
filtered, to engage in this behavior. Over time, this leads to an increase in the Hardening of
Spam Definition variable because the spam senders use tactics that non-spam senders do
not. In response, those tactics can become new rules for the content filters, which reinforce
their effectiveness.
As you can see, pulling Lever A via content filters creates a myriad of effects on the Spam
System. We can and have used the model to trace out these effects. In terms of evaluation,
it is unclear whether a given content filter or content filtering in general is good for the spam
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problem. To answer that question, one would need to attempt to quantify the effects and
compare them. However, I argue that content filtering should be avoided nevertheless.
The reason I take this stance is because other solution categories are more clearly beneficial,
which we will see shortly. In particular, other categories do not have the negative side
effects of the False Positives and Arms Race loops. These loops, in my opinion, are
extremely dangerous and should be avoided if at all possible. Because other solution
categories exist that do not have them, such avoidance is possible.
Additionally, as noted in Chapter 3, the content filtering category contains the most widely
deployed solutions to date, which have not yet resulted in a useful decrease in the Spam
Ratio. Given the rapid changing nature of spam, I infer that the Arms Race loop is
dominating the dynamics, negating the positive effects from the other loops. The False
Positives loop seemingly has not had that much of an impact to date, but I still believe it is
similarly dangerous and could cause significant problems if it were to get out of control. It is
particularly dangerous because it is a reinforcing loop as described above.
5.3 Access Filtering
The second category of spam solution types is Access Filtering. As noted in Chapter 3, the
major difference between access filtering and content filtering is that access filtering attempts
to block alleged spam senders from sending spam in the first place whereas content filtering
attempts to block alleged spam after it is sent. That is access filtering literally attempts to
block access, and from this perspective, it is easy to see why it pulls Lever B in attempt to
directly influence the Access to Methods variable. Again, I will briefly review how each of
the particular spam solution activities in this category goes about this task.
* Best Practices work to cut off a variety of methods used to send spam, e.g. open relays.
* Postage Costs cut off access to low-cost sending for some recipients.
* Computational Costs similarly cut off access to low-cost sending for some recipients.
* Server White Lists increase access to email servers for certain senders.
* Server Black Lists cut off access to email servers for certain senders.
* The Do-Not-Email-Registy cuts off access to those emails on the list.
* Reverse DNS cuts off access to email servers to those connecting from IP addresses
without Reverse DNS in place.
When this category of solutions is operating effectively, Lever B is pulled to achieve an initial
decrease in the Access to Methods variable (see Figure 17). As this occurs, Spam Capacity is
reduced in turn, which then reduces Spam Sent. And as we have noted several times, as
Spam Sent decreases, so does the Spam Ratio in turn.
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Therefore, as far as the Base Spam System is concerned, access filtering has a positive effect,
namely decreasing the Spam Ratio in the desired direction. However, there are two negative
side effects that can result as well and need to be considered (see Figure 18).
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These side effects are two loops identified with the same names as was seen in content
filtering because the underlying concepts are the same. However, the details are slightly
different in this context, and require further explanation. First, the False Positives loop in
access filtering stems from declaring non-spam senders as spam senders (as opposed to non-
spam messages as spam messages for Content Filtering). This results in increasing the Block
Valid Access variable as non-spam senders are blocked from sending.
An increase in the Block Valid Access variable decreases Non-Spam sent as the legitimate
senders blocked are unable to send mail. And to the extent that these valid senders make
their voices heard, it decreases the ability to do Access Filtering, and completes the loop.
Why this False Positives loop is significantly different from the similar loop in content
filtering is that in this context the loop does not reinforce the reduction in Non-Spam Sent
directly, but instead balances the application of the method itself. In other words, the loop
is not as dangerous because it does not fuel a reinforcing loop where Non-Spam Sent can
decrease on its own. Instead, Non-Spam Sent is reduced as an off-shoot of the False
Positives loop that reduces the effectiveness of access filtering.
Nevertheless, this False Positives loop is fundamental to discriminatory access filtering in the
same manner that the False Positives interaction is fundamental to content filtering. No
matter what discriminatory access filtering system one constructs, it will not be perfect, and
the False Positives problem will be present in one form or another. This negative side effect
can be escaped, however, if the access filtering is not discriminatory. In this case, it is not
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really filtering because it applies to all potential senders, i.e. no filtering is taking place. An
example would be blocking port 25 (usually SMTP) for all customers. Yet as soon as one
does not block for a certain subset of customers, e.g. low-volume senders, the False
Positives loop arises.
The second side effect, the loop labeled Arms Race, is anotherfundamental problem for
access filtering, again analogous to the same loop in content filtering. In the case of access
filtering, though, the Arms Race creates incentives to increase R&D (as opposed to Spam
Sent directly). As Access to Methods decreases, spam senders would of course like to
maintain their spam sending rates in order to maintain their Profits. Therefore, they must
expend more profits to research new methods in order to bypass those methods that are
now blocked by the access filtering.
Again, the Arms Race loop in the access filtering context is less dangerous than that in the
content filtering context. This difference stems from the time it takes to respond to the
solution. As noted in the last section, content filtering provided both the incentives and
opportunity to bypass the solution. The same is true for access filtering. However, in this
case the opportunity is mitigated by the significant time R&D takes to develop new
methods, while in the content filtering case, bypassing the solution is as easy as sending more
spam through existing methods.
The Arms Race loop in access filtering is further mitigated by the use of Profits to access old
methods. In other words, access filtering, in the aggregate, decreases Access to Methods by
increasing the costs associated with using those methods. In so doing, spam senders have a
choice-they can either bear this increased cost or spend that money on R&D to develop
other low-cost or similarly low-cost methods. In practice, it is probably a combination. At a
low level of increased cost, spam senders might simply pay to keep using the same methods.
But as this cost increases, they would invest in new methods as to protect the survival of
their business. In any case, I believe the incentives to counteract access filtering are
sufficiently in place as to render this Arms Race interaction a fundamental problem.
With regards to evaluation, it should be clear that non-discriminatory access filtering has one
positive effect on the spam system. That is, blocking methods for all senders regardless of
whether they are sending spam or not causes a reduction in Spam Capacity without a False
Positives problem. A variation of this is the Identifiability category discussed in the next
section. Yet, for the most part, access filtering is discriminatory and thus suffers from the
False Positives loop. And access filtering always suffers from the Arms Race loop.
Nevertheless, these loops are less dangerous than the analogous loops found in content
filtering. As such, access filtering should be preferred in general to content filtering.
However, I would also argue, like for content filtering, there are still other categories of
solutions where limited resources are better spent that do not have significant negative side
effects. One such category will be discussed next.
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The third category of spam solutions is Identifiability. Both of the spam solutions associated
with this category, IP Address Authentication and Content Signing, pull both Levers B and
F (see Figure 20). First, by pulling Lever B, they have an intended effect of decreasing the
Access to Methods variable, which has the same positive effect on the Spam Ratio variable
as outlined in the last section. In particular, identifiability solutions cut off Access to
Methods that forge sender information within messages. Recall that they do this by
comparing message sender information to that which real domain owners publish in DNS.
If the message information matches what is in DNS, then the message passes, and if not, the
message may be considered suspect.
Figure 19 Identifiability Effects
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Yet Identifiability solutions also pull Lever F, which results in directly increasing
Enforcement Capacity. This effect results from the fact that each of these solutions works
to help better identify the senders of messages, and hence the category title Identifiability.
Such identification is essential to enforcement, both public and private, and thus directly
increases Enforcement Capacity. An increase in Enforcement Capacity leads to an increase
in Enforcement Success, which in turn increases Perceived Consequences. As we have seen
before, an increase in Perceived Consequences leads to a decrease in the Desire to Spam
Variable, which decreases Spam Sent in the desired direction.
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However, with these positive effects, as we have seen for the other categories, comes at least
one negative effect (see Figure 20). In this case, forcing people to use Identifiability
solutions has a cost, which is captured in the Cost of Compliance variable in the figure.
When you institute any of these solutions, you are essentially raising the cost of sending
email for all senders. In the aggregate, we can expect less Non-Spam Sent as a result of an
Increase in the Cost of Compliance variable.
Figure 20 Identifiability Side Effects
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Yet this negative side effect can be mitigated by working to keep Cost of Compliance
minimal.26 Additionally, it does not create a loop whereby the solution itself is balanced or a
negative effect is reinforced. That is, this side effect seems less of a problem than the False
Positives and Arms Race side effects created by content filtering and access filtering.
As you can see, those dangerous loops are not present in the Identifiability case. This is
because these solutions apply to all email users, as opposed to just some email users
determined on a discriminatory basis. That is, as we noted with non-discriminatory access
26 For example, solutions could take a phase-in approach where users could gradually opt-in to the solutions
over time, minimizing the coordination compliance costs of switching to a given solution at one point in time.
Another example is solutions could re-use existing technology already deployed (e.g. DNS), minimizing the
training and re-training costs needed for implementation.
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filtering, since one is not choosing which senders the solution applies to, there is
fundamentally no False Positives problem.
Additionally, Identifiability solutions bypass the other fundamental problem of the Arms
Race seen earlier. To see this, consider implementing IP Address Authentication across the
board for all email providers. Then there is really no getting around this method for sending
email since it is now the new way to send email, i.e. there is no Arms Race. That is, one has
changed the basic way to send email to include the solution such that no new methods can
be created to avoid it. And since all senders are included, there is no possibility of false
positives.
That being said, for a given spam solution, the Cost of Compliance might be so high as to
not be worth it. Additionally, adding identity to e-mail may not be desired as well.
Nevertheless, of the three solution categories presented thus far, Identifiability solutions
seem to deserve significant attention. They warrant such consideration because it is clear
from the model that they have positive effects and that their negative effects are limited.
Furthermore, these solutions deal with the spam system in a holistic manner by attacking
both the legal and technical aspects of the problem simultaneously. In other words, they
make technical changes that are useful legally. That is not to say they will completely solve
the spam problem alone, but they should be considered as part of general strategies. Such
general strategy will be explored in the next chapter.
5.5 Regulation
The effects created by the spam solution category of Regulation are rather simple (see Figure
21). This category pulls Lever B in order to increase the Regulation variable. Solution types
in this category include State Spam Protection Laws, Federal Spam Protection Laws, as well
as private Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs).
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An increase in Regulation leads to additional Enforcement Capacity, i.e. new regulations
under which enforcement can usefully be brought to bear. As we saw in the last section, an
increase in Enforcement Capacity leads to a decrease in the Spam Ratio via an increase in
Perceived Consequences. Mitigating the initial increase in Regulation is the Legal
Protections variable.
In Figure 21, there is also a negative effect depicted, namely an increase in the Move to Less
Regulated Areas variable. This effect was explored in the last chapter as a balancing effect
against an increase in Perceived Consequences via Enforcement Success. In terms of
evaluation, because of this negative effect, Regulation is not strictly a positive influence on
the spam system. Nevertheless, I believe it is a necessary step to pursue.
Without regulation, the regulative balancing loops in the Base Spam System are ineffective.
And, as we have seen in the last section, the Regulative Reaction loop is important in the
usefulness of the Identifiability solutions. Without useful regulations present, then the
evidence gained from the Identifiability solutions is useless. Additionally, the negative effect
created by the International Problem loop can be mitigated through the International
Collaboration category presented next. As such, I believe regulation should be pursued to
the extent necessary to help other effective solutions. That is, regulation for its own sake is
probably unnecessary, but regulation tailored to aid other solutions, e.g. Identifiability
solutions, is particularly useful.
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5.6 International Collaboration
International Collaboration as a spam solution category is quite similar to Regulation. In
fact, the only difference is that the regulation created is international in nature, as opposed to
just applicable to one jurisdiction. As such, the effects produced by International
Collaboration are quite similar (see Figure 22).
Figure 22 International Collaboration Effects
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Of course, International Collaboration produces regulation, i.e. pulls Lever G to increase the
Regulation variable. This increase may not necessarily be binding international law, but
could be shared understandings in the form of treaty. For example, a treaty could allow for
reciprocal extradition of spam senders. In any case, whatever the form of the increase in
Regulation, an increase in Enforcement Capacity results, which leads eventually to a decrease
in the Spam Ratio as described in the last and other sections.
The significant difference between the International Collaboration category and the
Regulation category is that the negative effect for the Regulation category (an increase in the
Move to Less Regulated Area variable) has reversed polarity and been turned into a positive
effect for the international collaboration category. That is, international collaboration also
pulls Lever E to achieve a direct decrease in the Move to Less Regulated Areas variable.
This switch results from the fact that with true international collaboration, there are fewer
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places to move to, i.e. less places where those new regulations do not apply. In the case of
ideal international collaboration there is almost no where to go to escape the regulation.
What the model does not depict, however, is how hard international collaboration is to
achieve. I touched on this earlier in Chapter 3, where I described the slow UN process that
is taking place with regards to international standards for information technology related
crime. I just note here that achieving true international collaboration is difficult, but some
international collaboration is better than none. If a few countries sign a treaty, there are, as
noted, then a few less places where violations can easily take place. Therefore, to the extent
possible, the model recommends international collaboration.
5.7 Enforcement Capadciy
The final and sixth listed spam solution category is enforcement capacity. This category
includes spam solution activity that pulls Lever F in attempt to directly increase the
Enforcement Capacity variable (see Figure 23). Lawsuits increase enforcement capacity by
increasing the enforcement of existing regulations. The proposed bounty system
accomplishes this effect by helping prosecutors identify those which they would prosecute if
only they could do the identification themselves. And vigilante efforts produce a similar
result.
Figure 23 Enforcement Capacity Effects
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As we have seen in the past two sections, an increase in Enforcement Capacity can lead to a
decrease in the Spam Ratio as desired. Certainly directly increasing Enforcement Capacity
by pulling Lever F also leads to this effect. Also, an increase in Enforcement Capacity can
fuel further increases in Enforcement Capacity via the Precedent loop explored in the last
chapter.
For example, bringing lawsuits successfully can make it easier to bring more successful
lawsuits. There are at least three reasons behind the Precedent effect in this case: (1) often
the same legal teams bring suit, and thus their learned processes can be reused over time; (2)
similarly, the legal record of suits can be used by other legal teams; and (3) suits result in
court precedents that are reused by judges over time.
The negative interaction associated with increasing Enforcement Capacity is the same as that
associated with Regulation, namely an increase in the Move to Regulated Areas variable via
the International Problem loop. The reasons are also the same, but perhaps more clear in
this case. For example, if suits are being actively brought against alleged spammers, and
there are bounties out for them, it is not too hard to see why they might move to another
country where those things are less present.
Therefore, in terms of evaluation, enforcement capacity solutions are neither strictly bad nor
good, and depend on the tradeoff between the increase in Perceived Consequences from
Enforcement Success, and the decrease in Enforcement Capacity due to the International
Problem. As such, I believe the model derives the same advice as it did for the Regulation
category, namely Enforcement Capacity should be pursued in a targeted manner where
necessary to aid other effective solutions, e.g. International Collaboration or Identifiability.
5.8 Spam Solution Interactions Summarized
In this chapter, we have systematically used the model of the Base Spam System to
qualitatively describe the effects of spam solutions to date. Each category represents a set of
different levers pulled by spam solutions. We have seen that most categories produce
negative effects in addition to the positive effects sought. Some of the effects have been
noted as stronger as others. For instance, the False Positives and Arms Race loops created
by Content Filtering are particularly dangerous, whereas the Cost of Compliance effect
created by Identifiability solutions can be mitigated through careful planning.
Throughout the chapter, I have noted preferences for certain categories as a result, namely
Identifiability over Access Filtering over Content Filtering. I have also noted that Regulation
and Enforcement Capacity can be used to help other solutions, e.g. Identifiability, in
addition to being pursued alone. In general, solutions are not mutually exclusive, and you
can see from Chapter 3, most are going on presently in a simultaneous manner. In the next
chapter, I will attempt to synthesize the discussion in this and previous chapters in an
attempt to give advice to those trying to form effective spam solution strategies.
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6 Forming Effective Spam Solution Strategies
In the previous chapter, the spam solution activity presented in chapter 3 was evaluated
using the model of the Base Spam System outlined in chapter 4. In so doing, we revealed
how the six categories of spam solution activity identified interact with the spam problem.
Negative side-effects in addition to the desired positive effects sought were identified.
In this chapter, we synthesize the previous discussion and explore the topic of forming
effective sparm solution strategies. By pluralizing strategy I mean to emphasize that there
may be more than one effective spam solution strategy. As such, I hope to offer a general
way of thinking about spam solution strategy that can be used to advocate for more specific
strategies.
6.1 Key Spam Solution Issues
First, I would like to highlight the following issues associated with the spam problem that I
believe to be key issues when thinking about forming effective spam solution strategies.
These issues have all been mentioned in previous chapters.
* Precise Spam Definition: one that would declare sharp rules that could be used on
any email message to tell if it were spam or not. That is, ex ante application of the
definition would not result in a category of messages that require further
investigation.
* Accurate Spam Definition: one that if used and if it declared a message as spam, it
would indeed be spam.
* Response Subset: the existence of some real subset of the general population that
buys products and services advertised from spam.
* Low Monetary Cost: the ability to send millions of emails a day at relatively low
monetary cost.
* Low Computational Cost: the ability to send millions of emails a day at relatively low
computational cost, e.g. it does not take much time or resources to send an email
such that one can use relatively cheap hardware to do so.
* False Positives: declaring messages are spam when they are not spam, or declaring
senders as sending spam when they are not sending spam.
* False Negatives: declaring messages as not spam when they are spam, or declaring
senders as not sending spam when they are sending spam.
* Arms Race: engaging in a back and forth escalating process with those who
intentionally send spam because one provided them the incentives and opportunity
to do so.
* Identification: figuring out who exactly sent an email. This process is difficult now
because of the technical realities of the SMTP protocol.
· Legal Protection: tailoring regulation to not infringe on legal rights so much so to
make them unenforceable.
* International Problem: controlling those who intentionally send spam messages
across jurisdictions.
* Stratification: spam senders self selecting themselves through behavior.
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6.2 What Has Not Been Tried
First, recall the set of levers within the Base Spam System model as presented in the last
chapter (see Figure 24). These levers are also listed in the following table (Table 6) along
with the spam solution categories that attempt to pull them appropriately.
Figure 24 Base Spam System Levers
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Table 6 Base Snam System Levers and Snam Solution Caterories
Lever Spa Solution Categories
Lever A: Spam Ratio Content Filtering
Lever B: Access to Methods Access Filtering, Identifiability
Lever C: Response Rate
Lever D: Perceived Consequences
Lever E: Move to Less Regulated Areas International Collaboration
Lever F: Enforcement Capacity Enforcement Capacity, Identifiability
Lever G: Regulation Regulation
Lever H: Recipient Concern
From this table, you can see that most of the levers identified are pulled by at least one spam
solution category already discussed. The levers not targeted by at least one spam solution
category already discussed are Lever C (Response Rate), Lever D (Perceived Consequences),
and Lever H (Recipient Concern). Note, however, as was explored in the last chapter, the
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variables associated with these levers are indirectly influenced by some of the other spam
solution categories. They are just not directly targeted by those spam solution categories.
Nevertheless, I believe two new categories can be created to target these levers directly:
education and publicity. First, consider the new category of education. This category pulls
both levers C and H in the desired manner (see Figure 25).
Figure 25 Education Effects
Leq<a~
L rot.t0; tkts-( a^v
.. 'I
Reg?
K.. I'~ ~C FC. ;'X}Y
+ '\\
/i
i
I
i "
I \\
I
E~nF~:,clr-1 I1P~i~tLe e C
Education in this context would involve efforts to educate the public at large about the spam.
problem, including what they could do to help solve it. Such efforts could target Recipient
Concern, Response Rate, or both, and by targeting one, the other is likely to feel at least
some ancillary effects. For example, one could try to educate email consumers that buying
products and services from sparn hurts all email users, analogous to anti-drug advertisements
linking drug money to terrorism. Or one could simply raise awareness of the spam. problem
by highlighting through advertising that individual email consumers can help the sparn
problem by calling their congressmen and stating their interest.
If, in the aggregate, Recipient Concern is increased, then the model predicts Spammer
Alienation to increase from what it would otherwise be and Regulation to eventually increase
from what it would otherwise be as well. Similarly, if, in the aggregate, Response Rate were
to decrease as desired, we can expect Responses to decrease from what they would otherwise
be, and in turn Profits, which as we know plays a central role in the Ability to Spam,
Motivation, Innovation, and Initiative loops.
-f-
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To my knowledge, specific large-scale efforts that would fall into this education category do
not exist. There are smaller efforts in the form of Web sites that help to educate the public,
however. The main problem with this spam solution category in practice is that it is hard to
measure the effects of particular campaigns, and thus it is hard to predict a return on
investment to compare with other possible efforts. A second related problem is that the
target of such education efforts would have to be all email users, and usefully reaching that
large group is difficult and expensive. One way of course would be to use spam to educate
about spam, but that process seems like it would be setting the wrong example coming from
those who prosecute spam senders, i.e. the government.
The second new spam solution category is entitled publicity and pulls lever D in an attempt
to directly influence the Perceived Consequences variable (see Figure 26). If an increase in
that variable is achieved, we expect a decrease in the Desire to Spam variable. Such a
decrease, as we saw in the last chapter, should influence Spam Sent directly in the desired
direction as well as indirectly in the same direction via the Initiative loop. At the same time,
however, we expect an increase in Perceived Consequences to lead to a reactive increase in
the Move to Less Regulated Areas variable.
Figure 26 Publicity Effects
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Solutions in this publicity category would attempt to publicize successful enforcement of
spam senders. Presently, we see this in an ad hoc fashion via media outlets picking up
stories of spam lawsuits. However, there does not seem to be a widespread targeted
campaign to catalogue enforcement success and publicize it appropriately. Doing so seems
less daunting than efforts in the previous education category because the group one is trying
to reach (spam senders) is orders of magnitude fewer people. Additionally, this group is
presumed to be a relatively tight knit community, and so reaching them via spam sending
forums, computer magazines, common Web sites, etc. should not be as difficult (or costly).
In the next section, we consider these two new categories with the six other categories
already explored and make some initial strategy observations.
6.3 Initial Strategy Observations
Now that we have a more complete picture of how one could engage the possible levers, let
us turn to the negative side effects created by such engagement. The following table (Table
7) lists the now eight spam solution categories and identifies the levers targeted as well as the
negative side effects produced.
Table 7 SDam Solution Categories and Negative Side Effects
It is tempting to simply discard those categories with significant negative side effects in favor
of those without significant negative side effects. However, doing so would be premature
for two reasons:
1. Just because negative side effects exist does not mean that the effort as a whole is
not net beneficial for the spam problem. For instance, recall that content filtering
can have a positive stratification effect.
2. As noted in the last chapter, the categories are not mutually exclusive. We must
recognize that the spam problem is really a complex system, namely the Base Spam
A Systems Analysis of the Spam Problem
Category Lever(s) Negative Side Effect(s)
Content Filtering Lever A: Spam Ratio Arms Race
False Positives
Access Filtering Lever B: Access to Methods Arms Race
False Positives
Identifiability Lever B: Access to Methods Cost of Compliance
Lever F: Enforcement
Capacity
Regulation Lever G: Regulation International Problem
International Lever E: Move to Less
Collaboration Regulated Areas
Lever G: Regulation
Enforcement Lever F: Enforcement International Problem
Capacity Capacity
Education Lever C: Response Rate
Lever H: Recipient Concern
Publicity Lever D: Perceived International Problem
Consequences
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System presented in Chapter 4. As such, just concentrating on one category may
have the desired effect on the levers pulled in that category, but may leave open or
create ancillary effects on the other variables.
For example, one might declare after looking at this table that education and international
collaboration should be only pursued. Even if those efforts are successful somewhat, Access
to Methods might still be so high to keep the Spam Ratio significant. In other words, the
first initial observation we can make about forming effective spam solution strategies is that
a holistic approach is necessary. When forming strategies, we need to keep in mind the entire
Base Spam System and make sure we are plugging all the holes, so to speak.
That being said, where the same general effect can be achieved through multiple categories,
one should avoid the categories with negative side effects to the extent possible. That is, one
should avoid unnecessary negative side effects, which is the second initial observation we can make
about forming effective spam solution strategies.
Third, in the broadest sense, we want to avoid activiy that has a net neutral or net negative fect on
the spamproblem. That is, on net, resources spent towards that activity are wasted. The
reason why net neutral would still be bad is because we are assuming those resources could
have been spent to attain net positive results, and thus, if resources are spent towards a net
neutral activity, we have lost the opportunity cost from those expenditures.
More specifically, net neutral and net negative effects result when the desired net positive
effect is not achieved because either the particular solution in question is implemented
poorly or because the system reacts to counteract the desired effect. We shall ignore the
former in hope that particular solutions are well-implemented. The latter happening occurs
when creating the solution also provides the incentives and opportunity to counteract it to
the degree that counteracting efforts dominate the dynamics. In the next section, we
consider these initial observations in the formulation of a general spam solution strategy.
6.4 General Strategy
The previous three sections have synthesized much discussion about the spam problem and
the results obtained from the model of the Base Spam System. We have seen the key spam
problem issues and the key insights from the model. However, what has not been done is a
quantitative examination of particular solutions or categories, which is beyond the scope of
this thesis.
As such, the model does not necessarily recommend one particular strategy over another at
this time. Nevertheless, I believe the insights gained present a persuasive argument to move
in a general direction with regards to forming an effective spam solution strategy. I will now
present this argument and then an example strategy in the next section, followed by a
stakeholder analysis of that example strategy and an overview of its difficulties.
I have already argued that the negative side effects labeled Arms Race and False Positives are
particularly dangerous. I have also shown that these effects are fundamentalproblems
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associated with both content filtering and access filtering. As we have seen, however, both
problems are less concerning with regards to access filtering. Additionally, the False
Positives problem has been seemingly mitigated to date.
On the other hand, given that the spam problem has not subsided in the face of significant
content filtering and access filtering, I infer that the Arms Race problem is dominating the
dynamics of those solution categories. Further indication of such domination is the rapidly
changing nature of spam and the rapid introduction of new spam methods, both of which
are evidence of spam senders bypassing solutions in an Arms Race fashion.
If there were no other way to control Access to Methods than content filtering and access
filtering, then I believe they would need to be a part of an effective strategy. However, there
is another solution category that potentially has similar effects but does not have these
intrinsic side effects, namely identifiability. These solutions fundamentally change email so
that Access to Methods used to hide and steal identity is reduced for all email users. As we
have seen, because the email protocols themselves are changed, there is no Arms Race or
False Positives problem. The drawback of these methods is the Cost of Compliance.
However, the current leading proposals I believe do a good job keeping this cost under
control by phasing in the changes over time.
Additionally, I would advocate non-discriminatory access filtering, which as mentioned
previously, is a special case of access filtering that is not usually done. In non-discriminatory
access filtering, there is no filtering per se, but instead simply a ceasing to allow use of
particular methods, e.g. open proxies and open relays. As we have noted, access filtering in
general has the negative side effects mentioned, but if it is non-discriminatory, i.e. applies to
all email users like identifiability solutions, it escapes the False Positives problem. And
coupled with identifiability solutions that hinder identity masking, the Arms Race problem
would be mitigated because further identity masking methods would be harder to come by.
As discussed in the last chapter, the identifiability solutions attack the problem holistically by
producing technical change at the same time as increasing Enforcement Capacity. To aid in
that increase in Enforcement Capacity, the categories of regulation and enforcement capacity
should also be sought to the extent necessary to aid the identifiability solutions. How this
might be done is explored in the example strategy in the next section. Basically, though, it
involves creating regulation and providing enforcement resources necessary to get significant
enforcement success.
With identifiability coupled with regulation and enforcement capacity, one has effectively
made spam senders identify themselves and face enforcement or move to less regulated
areas. To the extent that the latter occurs, the international collaboration category should be
pursued to mitigate this negative side effect.
What we have not talked about yet in this general strategy discussion is the new categories of
education and publicity. I do not think education is effort well spent because I believe that
most email users are aware of the spam problem. However, one could test whether such
effort is useful through surveys. Similarly, it is unclear whether publicity is useful because
one might assume spam senders monitor enforcement success closely. Nevertheless, I think
it is a useful addition to general strategy because it is relatively inexpensive.
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To summarize this section on general strategy, I have argued that the current major
expenditures used for content filtering and access filtering would be better re-appropriated
towards identifiability and enforcement capacity. Doing so avoids significant negative side
effects that seem to be presently dominating the spam system dynamics and preventing the
alleviation of the spam problem. However, as noted in a subsequent section, this may not be
likely, though identifiability can be sought independently.
Additionally, this general strategy takes a holistic view of the complex system that is the
spam problem by jointly tackling the technical and legal issues. To the extent that this
strategy is undermined by the Move to Less Regulated Areas and Perceived Consequences
variables, international collaboration and publicity should be sought to counterbalance.
Similarly, significant regulation needs to be in place to enable successful enforcement. In the
next section, I will present an example strategy using this logic.
6.5 Example Strategy
This section enumerates an example strategy using the general strategy discussion from the
previous section as a basis. I would also like to reiterate that there may be several effective
spam solution strategies. First, consider the following facts discussed previously that help us
funnel the general strategy into the example strategy.
* There are only a few hundred major spam operations.
* A handful of email service providers, e.g. Hotmail (Microsoft), Yahoo!, AOL, etc.,
provide a large share of email accounts throughout the Internet.
* The US Congress passed the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, which took effect January 1,
2004.
* Most people who use the Internet use email, which includes most of the adult
population of the US.
Given the CAN-SPAM Act is in effect, and, as mentioned, is the result of increasing
Recipient Concern over several years that also resulted in many US state laws, we can
conclude two things: (1) Recipient Concern is significant enough to have already resulted in
significant Regulation; and (2) given this result, Recipient Concern must be relatively high.
Additionally, although many press reports have painted a negative picture surrounding this
law because of no traceable net-positive result to date, the law has not really been tested in
court in any significant way. That is, there has not yet been enough significant Enforcement
Success. Until such Enforcement Success occurs, the model predicts that we should not
expect a significant increase in Perceived Consequences and, in turn, a decrease in Desire to
Spam.
With these points in mind, consider the following example strategy.
1. Agree on a spam definition.
2. Enact regulations prohibiting spam according to the agreed definition.
3. Enact technological change to only the extent necessary to enable the introduced
legislation realistically enforceable.
4. Identify major spam senders that can be prosecuted under the law.
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5. Promptly and strictly enforce the introduced legislation, and in so doing,
permanently shut down operations sued.
6. Publicize successful enforcement.
7. Engage in international treaty to mitigate moves to less regulated areas.
The interaction of these steps with the Base Spam System is highlighted in Figure 27.
Figure 27 Example Strategy
+
Step
Step
The goal of this strategy is to make the Perceived Consequences variable high enough that
spam senders believe that they can expect to be promptly shut down if they engage in spam
sending. Additionally, the strategy simultaneously reduces Access to Methods to the extent
necessary to enable enforcement and keep the Perceived Consequences variable high. Note
that these steps would be conducted in an iterative process. That is, if on the way to step 5,
it is discovered there is problem with a previous step that makes it hard to enforce the
regulation from step 2, we need to back up and either do more of steps 2 or 3 to enable both
steps 4 and 5. Now I will briefly consider each step in a little more detail.
In terms of the spam definition (step 1), it is important to agree on a definition because if
one dominant definition of spam could emerge, activity currently spent arguing about what
is spam and what is not spam could be refocused on more proactively solving the spam
problem. Additionally, the choice of the definition of spam can shape the efficacy of spam
solution activity, and thus have a pronounced impact on the timeliness of solving the spam
problem. As such, I believe the definition that should be chosen is that adopted by this
thesis and the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, namely email that uses fraudulent tactics or does not contain
a valid opt-out mechanism. In Chapter 1, Section 9 (page 16), I enumerated several reasons why
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this choice is particularly useful. One major reason is that it stratifies spam senders from
non-spam senders as mentioned.
In terms of regulation (step 2), the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 may be enough public
legislation because (a) this Act enables the government to prosecute fraudulent spam
senders; and (b) creates significant penalties for violation. However, it may not be enough if
it proves too difficult to enforce, which only time will tell. Additionally, it may not be
enough if after step 7 there is still enough non-fraudulent spam to keep the Spam Ratio high.
If that is the case, then further regulation would need to be enacted to target a significant
portion of the remaining group of spammers, i.e. the definition of spam would have to be
expanded.
If we are to go with the CAN-SPAM Act as our primary regulation for implementing this
strategy, then individual states should concentrate on helping the Federal government
enforce that law as opposed to any state laws that may exist. The CAN-SPAM Act is much
more equipped to handle jurisdictional issues within the US, and is likely to be
constitutionally valid. Additionally, the Act enables a central enforcement agency, namely
the FTC, to act as a central repository for information necessary to prosecute targeted
operations. Instead of 50 states acting independently, all can now pool their resources by
sending useful information to this agency. Finally, the FTC with the backing of the Federal
government is in a better position to deal with the international nature of the problem.
In terms of technical change (step 3), the example strategy proposes that we should
concentrate, technically, on the issues that make step 4 (identification) and step 5
(enforcement) difficult. In terms of the spam solution categories, and as we saw in the last
section, this goal aligns perfectly with the identifiability category. In other words, what we
need is a way to show that certain messages were sent by certain operations to or from
certain places.
There are potentially many technical ways to do this, including the IP Address
Authentication and Content Signing proposals already mentioned. Since at least IP Address
Authentication seems to be happening, we can wait to see if that activity will have the
desired effect. The desired effect is of course prohibiting Access to Methods that allow the
masking of identity such that spam senders are forced to provide some traceable
information. This information can be used to do identification (step 4) and then
enforcement (step 5). In addition to identifiability, non-discriminatory access filtering may
aid these goals, e.g. prohibiting open proxies and open relays as mentioned in the last
section.
In terms of identification (step 4), vigilante groups such as the Spamhaus Project already do
good job of identifying spam operations. Since there are so few major operations, after
technical change produces useful traceable information, it should be additionally relatively
cheap to physically find these people. The FTC spam group should be tasked with this job
since they are also doing the enforcement. The main problem with this step, then, is tying
particular messages to particular people.
Again, with the technological changes enacted in step 3, this process should become much
easier. Vigilante groups are in a position, already maintaining data on spam operations, to
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simply add more data to their databases. Therefore, channels between these groups and the
big email providers should be instituted and/or become more open, with appropriate data
flowing between the providers and the groups. Similar channels, to the extent they do not
already exist, can then be established between the vigilante groups and the FTC or other
enforcement agencies.
Once found and identified definitively as spam senders, the actual people behind these
operations should be punished enough to deter other people from taking their place (step 5).
I imagine this means that these people would have to face some sort of jail time via criminal
statutes because civil fines will probably not be enough given widespread bankruptcy laws
and other legal avoidance mechanisms.
The first major hurdle to enforcement is testing the existing law in court. It might have been
drawn to narrowly to enforce usefully, or too broad to pass constitutional muster, though I
personally doubt both. If it proves to be unenforceable, it needs to be changed by Congress,
so that useful enforcement can proceed as quickly as possible.
After success, such success should be publicized as much as possible (step 6). Pursuing this
step involves the publicity category of solutions mentioned earlier in this chapter. In other
words, successful enforcement needs to be made known to all spam senders such that the
Perceived Consequences variable increases significantly. If for some reason isolated spam
senders are unaware of successful enforcement, the strategy is undermined because no
voluntary ceasing of spam sending would take place.
Finally, we expect from the model that if the Perceived Consequences variable is raised
significantly, some spam senders will move to less regulated areas. Hence the last step (7)
involves balancing this International Problem by targeting it directly via the international
collaboration solution category.
6.6 Example Strategy Stakeholders
To further consider the example strategy outlined, this section identifies how major
stakeholders might interact with it. The next section identifies and discusses some key
challenges in its implementation.
ISPs and ESPs
Perhaps the most critical stakeholder group in terms of implementing the example strategy is
comprised of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Email Service Providers (ESPs). The
reason why this group is so critical is that they are necessary to achieve a critical mass for the
identifiability solutions (step 3). These solutions, being technically on top of email, have
similar network efforts to email. That is, the more email accounts are using them, the more
useful they are. A quick way to achieve critical mass would be for the large ISPs and ESPs
to implement compatible solutions. I do not expect a large barrier for such implementation
because it is in the interest of ISPs and ESPs to implement identifiability solutions. They are
quite cheap to implement and can have a promise to reduce the spam problem for the email
accounts they operate, which is obviously good for business. We have already seen such
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activity taking place through AOL, Hotmail and Gmail's implementation of SPF as discussed
and through the Anti-Spam Technology Alliance where the major ISPs and ESPs are
exploring such solutions.
A potentially bigger challenge with this stakeholder group is their assistance in identifying
spam senders (step 4). Controlling most email accounts means that they also are bombarded
with a significant amount of spam. Appropriately logging and distilling this information
after identifiability solutions have been implemented will be critical to enforcement success
(step 5). The challenge is that creating and maintaining the systems to do so may not be
seen as the highest priority for this stakeholder group. However, this challenge is mitigated
by the private cause of action for ISPs and ESPs available to them under the CAN-SPAM
Act. As discussed, major firms have already filed suits under this provision, and as such
have identified that collection of evidence is important to them. Therefore, I believe ISPs
and ESPs do not present substantial barriers in terms of the example strategy.
State Governments
State governments can similarly help with steps 4 and 5 in the identification and prosecution
of spam senders. As mentioned, several states, including New York, Texas, and Washington
State have already pursued and prosecuted spam senders successfully. In and of themselves,
sate governments do not present a significant barrier to implementation because their
assistance is not strictly needed. However, they are in a position to help speed up the
potential positive effects of the strategy.
State governments via their Attorney Generals' offices have a unique ear to recipient
complaints about spam operations within their states. It is through these offices that the
states mentioned have initiated their law suits to date. It has been in their interest to do so
because of high recipient concern in their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, as discussed, the
CAN-SPAM Act preempted much of their state spam laws. As a result, states may now be
less likely to bring similar suits. This would be unfortunate because the resources currently
spent on combating the spam problem by states could be refocused on helping the FTC
collect evidence as needed and as directed by that agency.
It is understandable though, given federal preemption and FTC oversight that states may
cease significant efforts to combat the spam problem. One possibility to help realign
incentives would be to provide some funding via the FTC to help state-focused
investigations. After all, investigations within a given state would seemingly be better
operated by that state given their obvious knowledge advantage about the state environment.
FTC
In the example strategy, the FTC is tasked with orchestrating three critical steps:
identification, enforcement, and publicity (4, 5, and 6). This is a logical conclusion given, as
discussed previously, the FTC's forefront role in regulating the Internet to date. However,
to be successful in this major role, the FTC will have to devote significant technical and legal
resources to these tasks. Doing so could be difficult given that they have other priorities,
and must constantly defend their budgetary choices to Congress.
A potential barrier to implementation is that if the strategy starts to work, as predicted by the
model, less Recipient Concern could result. Such a decrease in concern could reduce the
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political demand for solving this issue, within the FTC and Congress. As a result, the
solution strategy could stagnate or reverse if resources are then diverted away from this issue
to other issues. One way to mitigate this risk is to, as just discussed in the ISP and ESP
subsection, encourage those firms to privately act against spam senders. Then even if FTC
incentives for enforcement are reduced, the ISPs and ESPs can maintain pressure since they
more immediately feel the effects of the spam problem.
Congress
Congress is of course essential in enacting appropriate legislation (step 2). As discussed,
their initial job may be complete if the CAN-SPAM Act turns out to be useful enough to
carry out the example strategy. If not, this law will need to be revised to enable the
successful completion of the strategy. However, revising laws can be a very slow process.
Even more so with Congress than with the FTC, if the given issue is not currently politically
a major issue, then it might not receive Congress' attention.
Similarly, Congress is in control of the budget of the FTC. If the spam problem issue wanes
with the public, the FTC's budget allocated for solving the spam problem could be under
pressure. Such pressure could be further exacerbated if Congress takes a budget cutting
approach in reaction to recent deficits. Again, the private cause of action in the CAN-SPAM
Act could mitigate this risk, assuming the CAN-SPAM Act enables successful enforcement.
Domain Owners
Like major ISPs and ESPs, domain owners are essential to implementing identifiability
solutions to the extent that those solutions center on domains, which they currently do (step
3). Unlike ISPs and ESPs, however, there are not a few domain owners that can achieve
critical mass. Instead, most domain owners need to take an affirmative action to make these
solutions work effectively, and that could mean actions by hundreds of thousands of
organizations. Such a coordinated effort could be difficult, and as discussed, this is the cost
of compliance negative side effect of these solutions.
Yet, this coordination problem should not significantly undermine the example strategy
because identifiability solutions create incentives for the domain owners to take the action
needed. In particular, as long as they perceive that taking such action will increase the
probability that their email will be perceived correctly, i.e. not as spam, then it is in their
interest to do so. Generally, this is the point of such action, so by default, identifiability
solutions provide such incentives. Furthermore, if major ISPs and ESPs were to implement
these solutions beforehand, which they are doing, then these incentives are greatly increased.
This increase is because those ISPs and ESPs control many accounts and so domain owners
can already increase the probability their email is perceived correctly on a high number of
email accounts.
Foreign Countries
Foreign countries present a unique problem to the implementation of the example strategy.
In particular, they are involved in the final step (7) where we try to control spam senders in
jurisdictions beyond the scope of US law. This challenge is discussed in the next section, so
I will only briefly discuss it here. From a stakeholder perspective, there may be incentives to
cooperate or not cooperate depending on the country and the way its citizens use email.
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If it is a country is like the US where email is an essential part of commerce and email
recipients are heavily targeted by spam senders, we can expect their government to feel
similar pressure to the US government. In that case, we can expect their cooperation and
probably their action to undertake a similar strategy. If, however, their country does not use
email extensively, their citizens are not spam targets, or their citizens derive great benefit
from spam sending, they might be less cooperative.
Repients
Recipients, as discussed, drive this problem by being targets to spam, responding to spam, as
well as raising concern to solving the spam problem. However, the example strategy does
not really involve them in any direct fashion. This is by design since this group is made up
of most people and thus has widely divergent characteristics and any solution involving all
recipients would face significant coordination problems.
The example strategy would essentially reduce the Spam Ratio for recipients over time,
which would presumably be welcomed. One issue already highlighted is that by doing so,
Recipient Concern might be significantly reduced, which could result in lower priorities for
ISPs, ESPs, Congress and the FTC in dealing with the spam problem. That is not
necessarily bad if the problem is solved though. That is, if Recipient Concern is low enough
because recipients are not wasting much resources dealing with a small Spam Ratio, then
perhaps resources that were spent lowering the Spam Ratio could now be reallocated to
other problems.
Span Senders
Spam senders are of course the target of the example strategy. The key desired effect with
this important stakeholder group is that an Arms Race feedback loop does not dominate the
dynamics of the strategy. As previously discussed, this positive feedback loop can be
inferred to be dominating presently. To ensure that it does not dominate the example
strategy, we must not provide the capacity and opportunity to easily bypass solutions. The
incentives to do will be there because spam senders presumably do not want to be deprived
of their current profits.
With identifiability solutions, there is certainly less opportunity and capacity to engage in
Arms Race behavior because these solutions apply to all email. Recall that for content and
access filtering, the Arms Race was easily achieved because systems could be employed to
bypass the solutions by attempting to produce false negatives and false positives. With
identifiability solutions, there are no false positives and false negatives. There can still be,
however, attempts to bypass the solution. These attempts must be controlled so as not to
trigger the Arms Race dynamic, or at least not in the same speed as is currently underway.
Attempts to bypass the solution will arise over time and are difficult to predict for obvious
reasons. However, two major possible attempts can be identified. First, to the extent
identifiability solutions rely on domains, spam senders can acquire many domains and switch
between them as needed. As discussed in the next section, this should create more evidence
that can be used for prosecution though, and so may not be desired by spam senders.
Second, as discussed previously and also in the next section, spam senders can move
overseas to escape US jurisdiction. This particular problem is addressed by step 7 of the
strategy via international collaboration.
A Systems Analysis of the Spam Problem Page 86 of 94
This stakeholder analysis has shown that the example strategy provides incentives to critical
stakeholder groups to carry out the strategy as designed. The next section will discuss some
key challenges to doing so.
6.7 Example Strategy Challenges
If the example strategy is net positive, which I believe it would be, then it arguably should be
pursued over current strategy that is arguably not net positive given the steadily increasing
Spam Ratio over the last decade. However, this example strategy has a couple of key
challenges.
First, the solution categories of access filtering and content filtering are likely to continue
regardless of any new strategy direction. The reason is that when these categories are
isolated from the rest of the spam system they make sense in the marketplace. When people
and firms buy filters and firewalls, they are not paying for the negative side effects they
create. Instead, they pay for the isolated direct positive effects they create. From an
economics standpoint, we can say that both content filtering and access filtering create
negative externalities. What further exacerbates this problem is that content filtering and
access filtering solutions are the easiest to pursue, and can be made by individual firms and
people.
The presence of content filtering and access filtering does not necessarily undermine the
example strategy, however. At the very least it means that resources spent towards those
spam solutions could be spent more productively to end the spam problem faster. Yet they
could undermine the example strategy if they interact negatively with identifiability solutions
in the technical change step. For example, we have noted that such identifiability solutions
would be best done through a relatively slow phase-in to reduce cost of compliance. If
content filters were to act strictly against those not phased-in, many false positives and false
negatives may be created in the process, hurting the overall spam problem via an increase in
the Spam Ratio. Such an increase could be wrongly attributed to the identifiability solutions
and undermine their acceptance.
Second, if there is successful enforcement and people really do go promptly to jail, i.e.
enforcement is believable, then it is expected spam sending will largely cease within the US.
However, as also mentioned, this would not stop non-US operations or those US operations
that feel they are making enough profits to take their businesses over seas. Thus, as noted, it
is probably necessary to make some agreements with other countries to prosecute non-US
spam senders. That is, engage in some international collaboration.
Note that new binding international laws are probably unnecessary, however. This is
because, while spam operations can exist outside the US, we are concerned with those that
target the US. Since our laws probably have enough jurisdictional authority to prosecute
successfully, the real issue involves extradition-getting the particular people in question
back to the US so that they can be brought to justice. And for other countries similarly
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interested in solving the spam problem for their citizens, they would simply need similar
national laws and push for similar extradition.
The problem with getting extradition and international collaboration in general, however, is
that many countries probably do not care about the spam problem and is not a politically
important enough issue to the US to press their involvement. That being said, the UN
process already mentioned is evidence that there is some concern and political will to act.
Given that we might only need extradition agreements, such minor collaboration might be
achievable if narrowly constructed.
Another more adversarial way around such collaboration, however, would be to block
Internet traffic to and from those countries that do not concede. This is possible to do
because it is possible to block traffic based on IP addresses, which can largely be traced to
countries, as mentioned previously. Countries certainly do not want their US Internet
blocked, and thus most would probably concede under such circumstances. There are of
course many issues with this policy, which are beyond the scope of this thesis. I mention it
only as a possibility worth consideration elsewhere. (Note that the federal government
would not necessarily have to be behind the blocking, but a consortium of large ISPs could
presumably undertake it alone.)
Third, even after identifiability solutions are implemented, it might still be prohibitively
expensive to physically locate spam senders. What the current identifiability solution
proposals do is tie messages to particular domains, and thus spam senders to particular
domains. This pushes the identification of spam sender problem to the identification of
who operates a given domain. This problem is easier to solve than figuring out who sent a
given forged email message, but it still can be difficult.
To procure a domain, payment information needs to be exchanged. Such information is
potentially much more useful in terms of traceability than forged email headers, but payment
information can of course also be fraudulent in many ways. In any case, it is an empirical
question whether one can track down domain owners for a cost low enough to be useful in
the enforcement of spam regulations. If it is not possible, there are still options, however.
One option is to make domain procurement stronger. Another is that content filtering can
be potentially brought back and made more useful through reputation systems based on
identifiability solutions. That is, if certain domains are truly identified as spam senders, those
domains can be blocked as we are now confident they are not forged. However, doing so
brings back the dreaded false positive and arms race problems.
6.8 Summary of Conclusions
In this chapter, I have attempted to synthesize the discussion from the previous chapters in
order to inform the making of effective spam solution strategies. Now I would like to
conclude this thesis by summarizing that synthesis.
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First, the spam problem is really complex system, and should be dealt with as such. This
complex system is made up of variables that are various causes and effects that are
connected in ways that create both reinforcing and balancing feedback loops.
Second, one can interact with this complex system by targeting certain variables with spam
solution activity. In so doing, one can expect the system to react based on the variable
targeted. Such reaction will result in other variables being influenced, which can lead to a net
negative or net neutral effect on the system. Solutions that produce such effects should be
avoided.
Third, when constructing effective spam solution strategy, a holistic approach needs to be
taken that considers the entire system. One example strategy that appears to do this has
been outlined, which concentrates on increasing the identifiability of spam messages so that
spam senders can be more easily prosecuted under existing law. The holistic approach also
necessitates examining the International Problem "hole," which would need to be plugged in
some fashion to be ultimately successful.
Fourth, the goal of any effective spam solution strategy is to reduce the Spam Ratio to a
reasonable amount. At that point, the ratio of spam email to all email for most recipients
should exist at a reasonable level, and wanted commercial email should be delivered
appropriately.
Finally, I believe the reason the suggested example strategy is being pursued less than would
otherwise be expected is the very reason that it is effective-it is holistic. It requires
significant coordination and alignment between various stakeholder groups (including the
Federal government) that has simply not yet taken place. In other words, while it may seem
simple because it is easily explained, such a holistic approach involving significant
coordination and allocation of government funds is never simple in practice.
This also explains why content filtering and access filtering are so prominent-because they
are so easy to pursue. Individuals can produce and engage such solutions in isolation via
inexpensive software. With the advent of the CAN-SPAM Act, however, I hope that the
necessary coordination to pursue more holistic strategy can begin to form. Even if you do
not find my argument for such coordinated strategy particularly persuasive, I hope that this
discussion has presented the spam problem in such a way as to enable you to think about the
problem more effectively.
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